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
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ARISTOTELIAN STUDIES

I

ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE SEVENTH BOOK
OF THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
CHAPTERS I—X

BY

J. COOK WILSON, M.A.

FELLOW OF ORIEL COLLEGE, OXFORD




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
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The Writer gratefully acknowledges his obligations to the Delegates of the Clarendon Press for their kindness in publishing this Study.

ORIEL COLLEGE, *September* 1879.

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PART I.

INTRODUCTION.

1. The repetitions in the works of Aristotle are so frequent and sometimes so perplexing that they cannot fail to draw the reader's attention : yet, until the publication of Torstrik's *De Anima*, some of their most striking features had received little notice, and their possible bearing on the history of the text was perhaps unsuspected. Torstrik observed correspondences of such a kind between repetitions in *De Anima* book III, as to incline him to the belief that the present order of the context had come, from some sort of combination of two parallel versions.

This theory has not been universally accepted ; but, apart from details, its general principle—the compilation of parallel versions, receives corroboration from a series of parallelisms to be found in many parts of Aristotle beside the *De Anima*, more remarkable too in length and in characteristics of matter or style.

Of these a number have been hitherto undetected ; in others the fact of repetition has been noticed, but relations of the most suggestive nature between the repeated passages have escaped attention : the study of them is valuable not merely for a knowledge of structure, but also for the elucidation of certain difficulties of translation, some insuperable, in the present text, which seem due to the fact that it contains passages not originally intended to stand together.

2. The parallel or duplicate passages here spoken of are in general of the following description :—

- (1) Each treats of the same subject as the other, and on the whole in a similar manner with varying degrees of correspondence and difference.
- (2) It often happens that one expands the other while observing the same main divisions : and sometimes the additions are vital, showing a real difference of view.
- (3) The expansion in the one piece does not appear like an ad-

dition or afterthought intended to follow the other in the same context : for the matter of the other is repeated so that each passage is complete in itself ; and sometimes the one which contains the supplement comes first, where the second is not a recapitulation.

- (4) In some cases the second passage begins with language which, naturally at least, implies that the subject is being discussed for the first time.

The likeness and difference therefore between these passages suggest that there must have been compilation of some sort as opposed to author's work.

In some instances no doubt the conclusion may be disputed : but (1) there is a strong cumulative argument from their great number, (2) there seems to be no lack of crucial examples where no other explanation appears possible ; so that it may be inferred of much attributed to Aristotle that it has been compiled from pieces which, whether by the same author or not, were at least not intended to stand in the same context.

3. The number of versions of the same subject is not confined to two, there are sometimes three or four, and these have been combined in several different ways. Let the consecutive members of one passage be denoted by the symbols A_1, B_1, C_1 , &c., and the corresponding members of its duplicate by A_2, B_2, C_2 ; so that one originally read in the order A_1, B_1, C_1 .

(a) Sometimes the passages have not been disintegrated :—

(i) Either one has been written immediately after the other in the order $A_1, B_1, C_1, A_2, B_2, C_2$;

(ii) Or they are separated by an interval in some cases of considerable length.

(β) Sometimes they have been disintegrated.

In this case corresponding members may be associated together so as to give the order $A_1, A_2, B_1, B_2, C_1, C_2$; or there is an intermixture of them in which no such regularity can be discerned ; and some may be carried to different parts of the book.

The last propositions (β) do not seem to have been enunciated before, and no doubt will appear improbable in the last degree. It is as though two (or more) narratives of the same discourse had been taken out of fragments left of the Gospels, divided into corresponding parallel verses, and then either the first verse of the one narrative written after the first of the other, the second after the second, and so on ; or else the verses intermingled without apparent principle.

Difficult as it is to account for this eccentric arrangement, there seem to be almost certain instances of it; there is one e.g. in Nic. Eth. bk. VII, ch. iii, and another in bk. V, ch. v¹, and with this evidence, that not only can the disentangled pieces be arranged in parallel groups, but whereas there seems to be incoherence which cannot be overcome in the present text, these groups are coherent within themselves.

4. For these various appearances the following explanation is conjectured.

The compilers looked on the reputed works of Aristotle as 'sacred books,' and considered themselves under obligation not to suppress any of the material which they found.

Consequently they incorporated in the text several versions of the same thing, even where they differed but slightly from one another: just as a Christian might regard the various accounts of the same events in the Gospels as of equal value and entitled to preservation in their original form.

The different ways in which they arranged and combined the duplicates may be accounted for by supposing that they endeavoured not to restore accurately an original order, but rather to make a context which would read with some appearance of continuity out of the *actual* fragments, adding and taking away as little as possible². There seem to be undoubted traces of connecting sentences written by a compiler: but the condition of the text indicates that it was a rule in some books at least to make such work a minimum; if this is so it would be caused by the same feeling as that which prompted the preservation of the duplicates. Whatever may be the worth of this hypothesis as to the motive of compilation, the fact of compilation itself seems to rest on strong evidence.

5. The exposition of the foregoing theory is begun with an examination of the Seventh Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, because in it are to be found some of the most striking instances of the phenomena alleged.

The first part, the account of *ἀκρασία* in chaps. i-x, seems to have been compiled out of at least three versions, which are perhaps not all by the same author. The second part, on Pleasure, was in all probability not intended to stand in the same treatise as the versions contained in the first; but this subject, as well as the authorship of the second part, is reserved for a later Study.

¹ Where four parallel versions seem to be combined. ² Compare paragraphs 91 and 95.

The Seventh Book of the Ethics is not the only one which seems to be a compilation; most of the books shew more or less trace of something of the kind: after the Seventh book the most remarkable is perhaps the Fifth. The resolution is more obvious in the Seventh, the evidence of diverse authorship stronger in the Fifth and Sixth¹.

Some of the parallelisms² on which the present theory of Eth. VII is based have been forestalled by Rassow, with whose book the writer has only recently become acquainted. The coincidences are accidental and do not extend far: the treatment of facts observed in common differs considerably.

¹ It is intended to consider these and some other parts of the Ethics hereafter.

² In eight passages out of about twenty-four, excluding the more dubious conjectures of Part V. The important parallelisms in chaps. iii (except AA'), v, vii, viii, as well as those in ch. x, seem to have been overlooked.

PART II.

COMPILATION OF PARALLEL VERSIONS.

SECTION I.

NIC. ETHICS, Bk. VII, Ch. iv. (TABLE II.)

6. The fourth chapter of Nic. Ethics bk. VII is one of the best specimens of the combination of duplicate passages forming different versions.

Rassow has already noticed in general terms that the second part of this chapter (§§ 5, 6, 1148 a 22—b 14) treats over again the subject of the first (§§ 2, 3, 4, 1147 b 23—1148 a 15), but attention has not been called to the remarkable completeness of the parallelism between them, member for member and phrase for phrase, nor the circumstance that both may have as a common beginning the first section of ch. vii. By writing this section before each of the two parts, two chapters can be obtained on the same subject, complete and independent (see below, paragr. 9 fin.).

This is easily seen if the chapter is arranged in two parallel columns as in Table I, where the corresponding phrases and words are marked by the same letters above the line.

7. The first column (§§ 2, 3, 4, 1147 b 23—1148 a 15) has three main divisions, B₁, C₁, D₁; to which correspond in the second column (§§ 5, 6, 1148 a 22—b 14) B₂, C₂, D₂.

B₁ and B₂ contain a classification of pleasures or pleasant objects; C₁ and C₂ treat of the ἀκρατεῖς καθ' ὁμοιότητα or κατὰ πρόσθεσιν and distinguish them from the ἀκρατὴς ἀπλῶς; D₁ and D₂ determine the kinds of pleasure with which the ἀκρατὴς ἀπλῶς has to do.

Thus the general divisions of the subject occur twice over, once in each column. More than this, things stated twice over in different connexions in the first column are stated twice in corresponding connexions in the second column, as follows.

B₁ beside classifying pleasures includes the statement that the *αἰρετὰ καθ' αὐτά* admit of a (wrong) *ὑπερβολή*.

C₁, in the same column, repeats this with the addition of *παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον* to *ὑπερβολή* (1147 b 31), in distinguishing the *ἀκρατῆς κατὰ πρόσθεσιν* from the *ἀκρατῆς ἀπλῶς*. The same thing is done in the corresponding members B₂ and C₂ of the other column: after the classification in B₂ it is said that error in the highest class, *τὰ φύσει αἰρετά*, is *ὑπερβολή*, and in C₂ this is repeated with the addition of *παρὰ τὸν λόγον* as in C₁ (compare 1148 a 28, 1148 a 33, 1148 b 4, in the second column).

Again in C₁, the discussion of the *ἀκρατεῖς κατὰ πρόσθεσιν*, it is said that the term *ἀκρασία* is applied in the case of *αἰρετὰ καθ' αὐτά* only by analogy: this is repeated in the same column in D₁, where the objects of the *ἀκρασία* proper are determined. On examining the corresponding members, C₂ D₂, of the second column, it will be seen that C₂ contains the same remark and D₂ repeats it. Compare the two passages marked ^f...^f, with the two marked ^h...^h.

8. To investigate more closely the parallelism of the members B₁ and B₂, C₁ and C₂, D₁ and D₂:—

(a) B₁ and B₂.

B₁ divides objects causing pleasure into two classes: *αἰρετὰ καθ' αὐτά*; and *σωματικά* or *ἀναγκαῖα*. B₂ gives the same under different phraseology: *φύσει αἰρετά*, called also in the same column (C₂) *φύσει αἰρετὰ δι' αὐτά* = *αἰρετὰ καθ' αὐτά*; and *τὰ μεταξύ* = *τὰ σωματικά*.

The examples too of the first class in B₁ are repeated in B₂: *νίκη*, *τιμή*, *χρήματα*, *κέρδος*, answer to *νίκη*, *τιμή*, *πλοῦτος*, in B₁.

But B₂ adds a third class not found in B₁, *τὰ ἐναντία τούτων* (i.e. *τῶν φύσει αἰρετῶν*), which appears to refer to the unnatural or abnormal pleasures discussed in ch. v. This amounts to a correction of B₁.

In B₁ it is said of the *αἰρετὰ καθ' αὐτά* that they admit of excess, implying that they are wrong in excess, as indeed is said more directly in C₁, in the same column. In B₂ the same thing is put in a clearer and better way: 'it is not susceptibility to these, nor desire and liking for them which are bad, but a certain excess in them' (*πρὸς ἅπαντα . . . τὰ τοιαῦτα . . . οὐ τῷ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν ψέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῷ πως ὑπερβάλλειν*, 1148 a 26–28).

The badness of *ἀναγκαῖα* or *σωματικά* when indulged in to excess is not stated in B₁; though half implied by the term *ἀναγκαῖα*, and asserted lower down in the same column (D₁). In B₂ the fact is expressly mentioned (see 1148 a 26–28).

From these considerations it is evident that B_2 is not a mere recapitulation of B_1 for it contains more, that it is not a mere addition to B_1 for it contains the same matter as B_1 : it is rather an entire reconstruction which makes B_1 quite unnecessary.

(β) C_1 and C_2 .

According to C_1 (see above, paragraph 7 fin.) error in respect of *αἰρετὰ καθ' αὐτά* which is *ὑπερβολὴ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον* does not make a man *ἀκρατὴς ἀπλῶς*, and is only to be called *ἀκρασία* by analogy, *καθ' ὁμοιότητα*: of such error the word *ἀκρασία* cannot be used simply but must have the addition (*πρόσθεσις*) of some qualifying term. All this is repeated phrase for phrase in C_2 , as will be seen by comparing the parallel columns.

In C_1 the author says, as a proof of the validity of the distinction made between the *ἀκρατὴς ἀπλῶς* and the *ἀκρατὴς κατὰ πρόσθεσιν*, that there is a special stigma attaching to true *ἀκρασία* which does not attach to *ἀκρασία* in the *αἰρετὰ καθ' αὐτά*; true *ἀκρασία* being not merely a fault but a sin, *ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρασία ψέγεται οὐχ ὡς ἁμαρτία μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς κακία τις*. The same corroboration of the same distinction is given in C_2 , *ἡ γὰρ ἀκρασία οὐ μόνον φευκτὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν*.

C_2 makes some additions to the common matter, not however in themselves very important. It gives further examples of the *φύσει αἰρετά*, viz. *τέκνα* and *γονεῖς*, illustrating the nature of *ὑπερβολή* in relation to them by the stories of Niobe and Satyrus: it elucidates at a little more length than C_1 the difference between *ἀπλῶς* and *καθ' ὁμοιότητα*, or *κατὰ πρόσθεσιν* (*οἶον κακὸν ἰατρὸν καὶ κακὸν ὑποκριτὴν, δὲν ἀπλῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν κακόν*); and excludes from connexion with *αἰρετὰ καθ' αὐτά* not only *ἀκρασία* proper (as C_1) but also *μοχθηρία*.

Thus again C_2 repeats the matter of C_1 with some additions, and in such a manner as to make C_1 superfluous.

(γ) D_1 and D_2 .

D_1 restricts the objects of *ἀκρασία* proper to those pleasures with which the *σώφρων* and *ἀκόλαστος* are concerned; D_2 does this also. Compare the passages marked ^m...^m in the parallel columns. The parallelism of the passages marked ^h...^h has already been pointed out (see above, paragraph 7 fin.). It should also be noticed that the examples of *ἀκρασία καθ' ὁμοιότητα* given in the first column (C_1 , D_1), *χρημάτων, κέρδους, τιμῆς, θυμοῦ (δργῆς)*, are all given again in the second column (D_2), *κέρδους, τιμῆς, θυμοῦ*; and that the example named twice in the first column (*θυμοῦ* in C_1 , *δργῆς* D_1) is named twice in the second column (D_2 , *περὶ δὲ θυμὸν καθ' ὁμοιότητα λέγομεν διὸ καὶ προστιθέντες ἀκρατῇ θυμοῦ ὥσπερ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους φαμέν*).

But though the main subject of D_1 , viz. the kind of pleasure sought by the ἀκρατής ἀπλῶς, is repeated in D_2 , there is something more in D_1 , for it gives examples of these pleasures and adds the important remark that the ἀκρατής acts παρὰ προαίρεσιν, whereas up to this point the additions have been made by the second column on the first, and not by the first on the second.


This however does not disprove the relation of D_1 and D_2 as independent duplicates. For firstly, D_2 is clearly not a resumé of D_1 ; and as D_1 belongs to the context of B_1 and C_1 , so D_2 belongs to the context of B_2 and C_2 , which have been shewn to be independent duplicates of B_1 and C_1 . Secondly, as the object of this chapter is to distinguish the ἀκρατής ἀπλῶς from the ἀκρατής κατὰ πρόσθεσιν it is not absolutely necessary to mention that the ἀκρατής ἀπλῶς acts παρὰ προαίρεσιν, a characteristic common to all ἀκρασία. Thirdly, this characteristic of ἀκρασία may well have followed in the version of which the second column was originally part, later on, either in a subsequent chapter or in a lost continuation of this one; and indeed there is some ground for thinking that something now removed stood originally after D_2 (see below, paragr. 81-7).

9. The above analysis seems to prove that the two columns are independent, and that the second column is a reconstruction of the first, intended to replace it. Even if both were written by the same author he could not have meant them to stand finally in one and the same context as they do now: for they are alternatives, and if he kept one he must have rejected the other.

The words καθάπερ διεΐλομεν πρότερον in B_2 may be the work of a compiler. But if they are genuine, they cannot refer to the beginning of ch. iv, § 2 (B_1), on account of the relation of the two columns just pointed out: and apart from this they do not suit it, since the threefold division of ἡδέα is not found there.

Both columns begin with ἐπεὶ δέ, and it will be seen that either may be read after the first section of the chapter, A, with equal coherence both in syntax and subject matter. Thus each of the two orders $A B_1 C_1 D_1$, $A B_2 C_2 D_2$ yields a chapter on the same subject as the other, and very like it.

A short passage omitted in Table I from the end of the first column (1148 a 16-22) will be discussed below in Part V, Section VIII.



SECTION II.

NIC. ETH. VII. viii. §§ 4, 5. (TABLE VI.)

10. There is strong evidence that § 4 (1151 a 11-19) and § 5 (1151 a 20-28) of ch. viii were not intended for the same context, and that their present position is due to compilation.

(α) Both discuss the same subject, ἀκρασία and the superiority of the ἀκρατής to the ἀκόλαστος, in the same manner. Their contents are parallel phrase for phrase, as may be seen by comparing the words distinguished by the same letters in the columns of Table VI.

To ὥστε δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν . . . in A_1 (the second column) corresponds in A_2 (the first column) ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ διὰ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν: τὸ ἀνέδην τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονάς, in A_2 , τὰς καθ' ὑπερβολὴν σωματικὰς ἡδονάς, in A_1 : τὸ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον in A_2 , the same words in A_1 : τὸ . . . ὁ ἀκρατής βελτίων τοῦ ἀκολάστου . . . σώζεται γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον ἢ ἀρχή, in A_2 , the sentence in A_1 ἐκείνος μὲν οὖν εὐμετάπειστος, ὁ δ' οὐ· ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ κ.τ.λ. See also Part IV, Section II.

There is no reason whatever in the context for the repetition by A_1 of the matter in A_2 . A_1 , the later in order, is not a necessary addition to A_2 ; on the contrary, A_2 is the fuller in statement: e.g. it expands σώζεται γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον ἢ ἀρχή, found in the second column, into several explanatory lines. On the other hand, an inspection of the parallelisms shews that A_1 cannot be treated as a resumé of A_2 , as is proved also by the next argument (β).

It is true that A_1 adds the mention of the character opposed to the ἀκρατής, viz. ὁ ἐμμενενικὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐκστατικὸς διὰ γε τὸ πάθος, i.e. the ἐγκρατής, but this might have been added at the end of A_2 , and could not of itself necessitate the repetition of all that is said in A_2 .

(β) The beginning of § 5 (A_1 , 1151 a 20) introduces the ἀκρατής as if he had not yet been described at all: ΕΣΤΙ ΔΕ ΤΙΣ διὰ πάθος ἐκστατικὸς . . . οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀκρατής. But the very account, thus put forward as though it were new, has already been given, and that more fully (see above, and compare Part IV, paragraph 43) in the passage which has just preceded (A_2 , 1151 a 11-19). This is enough to shew that the author of A_1 could not have meant it to follow A_2 as it does now.

(γ) The words at the end of § 4 present an insuperable difficulty in

the present arrangement of the text,—*σώφρων μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀκόλαστος* δὲ ὁ ἐναντίος: for the characters just spoken of are not the *σώφρων* and the *ἀκόλαστος*, but the *ἀκρατής* and the *ἀκόλαστος*. The author has been saying that the *ἀκρατής* can be persuaded without much difficulty to reform because he has not lost the moral ἀρχή, but that this is not so with the *ἀκόλαστος*, because he has lost it. Compare the passages marked *d* and *e* in the other column.

This difficulty is at once removed if the independence of the parallel passage is recognised, for the sentence *σώφρων μὲν κ.τ.λ.* which will not fit on to the end of *A*₂ (§ 4) where it now stands, does fit perfectly to the beginning of the parallel version *A*₁; that is, it is only necessary to consider it as belonging not to the passage which it follows, but to the passage which it precedes (see Table VI). The beginning of the account of *ἀκρασία* in *A*₁, *ἔστι δέ τις κ.τ.λ.*, implies that it comes after the account of some other character or characters to which *ἀκρασία* is related; now as the nature of *ἐγκράτεια* is determined in outline at the end of *A*₁ (§ 5, 1151 a 26), it is reasonable to suppose that the passage originally preceding *A*₁, in the version to which *A*₁ belonged, had described the *σώφρων* or *ἀκόλαστος* or both. With such a supposition the words *σώφρων μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος κ.τ.λ.* accord exactly, and they may well be the wind-up of a lost description, probably short, of *σωφροσύνη*. They may perhaps however be due to a compiler (see paragraph 12 fin.).

11. The above arguments (*a*, *β*, *γ*) seem to show conclusively that *A*₂ and *A*₁ are two independent parallel versions. The difficulties pointed out in (*β*) and (*γ*) are of special importance, as they cannot be explained away so long as the received text is held to be right. They are not removed by a mere transposition of *A*₁ and *A*₂; for the words *σώφρων μὲν κ.τ.λ.* could not come immediately after § 3 (i.e. after 1151 a 10), nor as before said at the end of § 4 (1151 a 19); nor if these words are struck out can the beginning of *A*₁, *ἔστι δέ τις κ.τ.λ.*, come after § 3: besides, the argument (*a*) would remain *mutatis mutandis*.

The words *τοιούτας ἡδονάς*, in § 5 (*A*₁, 1151 a 23), cause no difficulty; they will refer to some expression like *σωματικὰς ἡδονάς* used in the context which originally came before *A*₁.

12. It should be noticed that the version *A*₁ fits on to nothing in ch. viii, whether the beginning of *A*₁ is put at the words *σώφρων μὲν* or at *ἔστι δέ τις*: nor indeed does it seem to fit on to anything in the book. It is doubtful too whether *A*₂ is in its place (see paragr. 75 fin.).

Further on (Part IV, paragraph 43) it will be shewn that *A*₂ is

probably later than A_1 . It seems possible in this case to explain why the compiler put the later and more detailed version first. As already said, whether A_1 begins at $\sigma\acute{\omega}\phi\rho\omega\nu \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu \kappa.\tau.\lambda.$ or at $\xi\sigma\tau\iota \delta\acute{\epsilon} \tau\iota\varsigma \kappa.\tau.\lambda.$, A_1 could not follow after § 3 (1151 a 10). On the other hand, though the beginning of A_2 (§ 4, 1151 a 11) does not necessarily connect it with § 3 fin., the transition from § 3 to § 4 is not intolerable, or at least not so intolerable as from § 3 to § 5, and this would suggest putting A_2 where it is rather than A_1 .

Again, if A_1 really began with $\sigma\acute{\omega}\phi\rho\omega\nu \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu \omicron\upsilon\nu$, the compiler might be deceived by the general resemblance of § 4 to Nic. Eth. VI. v. 6 (1140 a 11–20 q.v.), where the $\sigma\acute{\omega}\phi\rho\omega\nu$ and $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\lambda\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\varsigma$ are distinguished, into supposing that the end of § 4 treats also of $\sigma\acute{\omega}\phi\rho\omega\nu$ and $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\lambda\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\varsigma$, and then he might think that the words $\sigma\acute{\omega}\phi\rho\omega\nu \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu \kappa.\tau.\lambda.$ at the beginning of A_1 would follow well after the end of A_2 : see paragr. 91. Or if A_1 began at $\xi\sigma\tau\iota \delta\acute{\epsilon} \tau\iota\varsigma$, the compiler may have written the sentence $\sigma\acute{\omega}\phi\rho\omega\nu \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu \dots \epsilon\nu\alpha\nu\tau\iota\omicron\varsigma$ to connect § 5 (A_1) with what, for the reason just given, he may have wrongly taken to be the meaning of § 4 fin.

SECTION III.

NIC. ETH. VII. v. §§ 5–8. (TABLE III.)

13. This chapter may be divided into three parts; §§ 1–4, 1148 b 15–34 (A_3); §§ 5, 6, 1148 b 34–1149 a 12 (B_3); §§ 7, 8, 1149 a 12–1149 a 20 (B_2). See Table III. Of these the first explains and illustrates the difference of the natural and unnatural or abnormal pleasures. The second, B_3 , teaches that $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\rho\alpha\sigma\iota\alpha$ proper and $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\lambda\alpha\sigma\iota\alpha$ ($\mu\omicron\chi\theta\eta\rho\iota\alpha$) have nothing to do with the unnatural pleasures: this restriction is made over again in the third part, B_2 , in the same way and almost the same words.

14. The parallelism of B_3 and B_2 is shewn by the following:

§ 5 (B_3) contains the distinction of mere liability to feel unnatural appetites ($\tau\omicron \xi\chi\epsilon\iota\nu \xi\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\alpha \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omega\nu$) from overcoming or yielding to them ($\tau\omicron \xi\chi\omicron\nu\tau\alpha \kappa\rho\alpha\tau\epsilon\iota\nu \eta \kappa\rho\alpha\tau\epsilon\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$). In § 7 (B_2) the same distinction is given with a slight difference of statement (see below, paragraph 48), and with no indication that it has been given before: $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omega\nu \delta' \xi\sigma\tau\iota \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu \xi\chi\epsilon\iota\nu \tau\iota\nu\acute{\alpha} \acute{\epsilon}\nu\lambda\omicron\tau\epsilon \mu\acute{\omicron}\nu\omicron\nu \mu\eta \kappa\rho\alpha\tau\epsilon\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota \delta\acute{\epsilon} \dots \xi\sigma\tau\iota \delta\acute{\epsilon} \kappa\alpha\iota \kappa\rho\alpha\tau\epsilon\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota \mu\eta \mu\acute{\omicron}\nu\omicron\nu \xi\chi\epsilon\iota\nu$.

In § 5 (B_3) $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\rho\alpha\sigma\iota\alpha$ in respect of the unnatural pleasures is said not to be $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\rho\alpha\sigma\iota\alpha$ proper, $\eta \acute{\alpha}\pi\lambda\eta \acute{\alpha}\kappa\rho\alpha\sigma\iota\alpha$, but analogous to it, $\kappa\alpha\theta' \acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\iota\omicron\tau\eta\tau\alpha$:

so in § 8 (B_2) the same thing is found again; 'such ἀκρασία is not to be called so ἀπλῶς, but only κατὰ πρόθεσιν.'

To the word ὑπερβάλλουσα applied to unnatural vice in B_3 corresponds according to B_2 [οὐ κατ' ἀνθρωπον] and [οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη], implied by κατ' ἀνθρωπον and ἀνθρωπίνη. Such error is called in B_3 θηριώδης or νοσηματώδης, and this is repeated in B_2 .

15. It is clear that the repetition of the matter of B_3 by B_2 is wholly unnecessary; also that B_2 is complete without B_3 , and does not in any way presuppose that B_3 , which is before it in the present text, has preceded.

It should be noticed that B_3 and B_2 begin in nearly the same manner, τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν τούτων ἕκαστα . . . (B_3), τούτων δ' ἔστι μὲν ἔχειν τινὰ (B_2); and that each passage is connected in the same way through the word τούτων with the first part of the chapter (A_3), so that there is equal coherence whether B_2 or B_3 is read after A_3 .

Thus B_3 and B_2 are independent parallel versions of the same subject.

It will be shewn in Section IV that ch. vi, §§ 5-7, is a duplicate version of chapter v, with members $A_1 B_1$ corresponding to $A_3 B_3$ ($=B_2$). There are then in chapters v and vi three parallel versions of the same subject: of these two seem to be complete or nearly so, $A_1 B_1$ and $A_3 B_3$; of the third only B_2 remains, of which the beginning (A_2) may have been lost.

SECTION IV.

NIC. ETH. VII. vi. §§ 5-7. (TABLE III.)

16. The passage ch. vi, §§ 5-7 falls into two parts. The first, A_1 , is a division of bodily pleasure into natural or human, and unnatural, brutish, or morbid. The second, B_1 , limits the sphere of σωφροσύνη and ἀκολασία to the natural pleasures (περὶ τὰς πρώτας, i.e. τὰς ἀνθρωπικὰς καὶ φυσικὰς): with respect to the pleasure of brutes these terms, it is said, can only be used by a metaphor. Then follows an account of the difference between θηριότης and κακία.

But these two parts $A_1 B_1$ correspond in outline to the two main parts of ch. v, A_3 and B_3 ($=B_2$)—see above, paragraph 13—which discuss the same distinction in pleasure and of characters related to pleasure, though with some variations.

17. Is it possible then that one version of ch. v is intentionally repeated by ch. vi, §§ 5-7, and that both passages belong to the same context?

The words *ὥσπερ εἴρηται κατ' ἀρχάς* may suggest at first an affirmative answer, but a nearer examination seems to prove that the second passage was not intended for the same context as the first, and is a parallel version of it.

(α) There is no manner of reason for the repetition of the subject in this place: on the contrary, it is an obvious violation of coherence; for in the present text the discussion of unnatural vices and pleasures is wound up in ch. v, § 9, 1149 a 20 seqq. (q. v.), and the second account interposed quite irrelevantly between *ἀκρασία θυμοῦ* (vi, 1-4) and *μαλακία* (ch. vii).

(β) The second part (B_1) of the present passage, though treating of the same matters as the second part of the versions in ch. v, B_3 and B_2 , shows no consciousness of their existence.

(γ) A_1 , vi, 6, introduces the classification of natural and unnatural pleasures, as though, while suggested by something previous (*κατ' ἀρχάς*) it was formally adopted now for the first time:—*αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰς διαφορὰς ληπτέον, ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται κατ' ἀρχάς, κ.τ.λ.* 1149 b 26.

The differentiae meant, 'natural' and 'unnatural,' have been fully recognised and applied in ch. v already, more fully indeed than here.

But that such a definite settlement of the differentiae has not yet taken place would be naturally implied by *ληπτέον*, and the word must imply this, because the classification is noticed with the same object here as before, to determine, namely, with more precision the sphere of *ἀκολασία*, &c.

(δ) The incoherence above described (α) is removed if either of the two passages which exclude *ἀκολασία*, &c. from connection with unnatural appetite be omitted, and the other retained. In either case there would be a complete order in the language, and the subject-matter would be, in outline at least, the same.

(i) Suppose ch. v, §§ 1-8 (A_3 , B_3 , B_2) taken out, so as to give the order—ch. iv,—ch. v, § 9.—ch. vi, § 1-4.—ch. vi, § 5-7. Ch. v, § 9, serves at once to sum up the result of ch. iv. in the words *ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία*, and to introduce in the words *ὅτι δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.* the subject of ch. vi, §§ 1-4, *ἀκρασία θυμοῦ*. Ch. vi, § 5 sums up the contents of both ch. vi, §§ 1-4 (*ὥς μὲν τοῖνυν, κ.τ.λ.*) and of ch. iv, §§ 1-4 (*καὶ ὅτι ἔστιν, κ.τ.λ.*) and forms the transition to ch. vi, §§ 6-7.

(ii) Secondly, if ch. vi, §§ 5-7 (A_1 , B_1) is omitted there is equal

coherence, because ch. v, § 9 (*ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία, κ.τ.λ.*) from its form serves either to sum up ch. iv by itself, or chaps. iv and v together. See also paragraph 71.

(ε) As to the words *ὥσπερ κατ' ἀρχάς*—even if it were not possible to find another passage in the book to which they might refer, the above arguments seem to make it certain that, if genuine, they cannot refer to ch. v.

But beside this, (i) the form of the reference is quite against relating it to ch. v; and (ii) a passage can be found which fits it in form and matter much better than that chapter.

(i) 1. It has been argued that because *κατ' ἀρχάς* need only refer to the beginning of a subject, and not necessarily to the beginning of a book, it is the beginning of the account of unnatural appetite and vice in ch. v which is here signified.

The inference is unsound: *ὥσπερ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἰρηται* must mean at least 'the beginning of the present subject'; now the discussion of unnatural appetite being finished off in ch. v, § 9 and a transition made to a new subject not included in it—for *ἀκρασία θυμοῦ* is not an unnatural vice—it follows that a reference to 'the beginning of the present subject,' coming directly after the new discussion, cannot be intended for ch. v.

Again, 'the present subject' must be one which comprises *ἀκρασία θυμοῦ*; the most special subject which comprises it, is the general account of *ἀκρασία κατὰ πρόσθεσιν* begun in ch. iv; but there is obviously nothing in that chapter which suits what is said here (1149 b 27-9).

2. The phrase *ὥσπερ κατ' ἀρχάς* does not seem to be used when the 'beginning' referred to is at such a short distance (the preceding chapter) as ch. v would be in the present case; but only when it is so far off that it is better for the sake of clearness to take this rather than a more general form like *ὥσπερ εἰρηται*.

This is borne out by all the passages collected in Bonitz's Index. In *Metaph.* XIII. x. 1086 b 15, the reference is to *Metaph.* II. iv. 999 b 24, and II. vi. 1003 a 6: an interval of eighty-three pages. In *De Anima* III. iii. 427 a 29, to *De An.* I. ii. 404 a 17, 405 b 10-17: an interval of twenty-two pages. In *Pol.* IV. viii. 1293 b 27, to III. vii. 1278 a 22: an interval of fifteen pages at least, and much more in the new order of the books. In *Post. An.* I. xxii. 84 a 32, to *Post. An.* I. iii. 72 b 5, seqq.: twelve pages. In *Phys.* VIII. v. 260 a 11, to *Phys.* VIII. i. 250 b: nine pages and a half. In *Eudemian Ethics* VII. v. 1239 b 7, to *Eud. Eth.* VII. i. 1235 a 4: four pages and a half.

The smallest interval is about three hundred and fifty lines, and in every passage the usage is quite different to that proposed here¹.

(ii) Secondly, there is a passage in the book which from the standpoint of ch. vi could properly be called *κατ' ἀρχάς*, and contains the distinction of natural and unnatural pleasure referred to; this is at the beginning of the treatise, ch. i, § 3, 1145 a 27 seqq.

To the contents of this latter place ch. vi, § 6 (A₁) corresponds much better than to anything in ch. v.

In vi, 6, *ἀνθρωπικαὶ ἡδοναὶ* is synonymous with *φυσικαὶ ἡδοναὶ*, with this ch. i, § 3, *ὁ θηριώδης ἐν ἀνθρώποις σπάνιος* at least agrees. But in v, 1 (A₃), this is not so, the distinction of *φύσει* and *μὴ φύσει* is extended to the pleasures of brutes, and therefore 'natural pleasure' is not co-extensive with 'human'—*καὶ τούτων* (= *τῶν φύσει ἡδέων*) *τὰ μὲν ἀπλῶς τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένη καὶ ζώων καὶ ἀνθρώπων*. The categories under which unnatural pleasures are spoken of in ch. v (A₃) are *θηριώδεις, διὰ πηρώσεως, διὰ νόσους* (pleasures actually caused by disease), *νοσηματώδεις*² (pleasures of the nature of a disease), *διὰ μανίαν, ἐξ ἔθους, διὰ μοχθηρὰς φύσεις*. Both ch. vi, 6, and ch. i, 3, agree in naming only the first three of these.

If it be objected that the words *καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ μεγέθει* have nothing exactly to suit them in ch. i, 3, the same objection holds of ch. v. If it be said that in ch. v, *ὑπερβάλλουσα* (1149 a 5, § 5 fin.) corresponds fairly to *ἐν μεγέθει* in ch. vi, then so does *ὑπερβάλλοντας* in ch. i, § 3, 1145 a 32.

It seems to follow then that the contents of ch. i, § 3, suit the reference in ch. vi, 6. much better than do the contents of ch. v, §§ 1-3; and that while the position of ch. i, § 3, relative to ch. vi suits the meaning and usage of the formula *ὥσπερ εἴρηται κατ' ἀρχάς*, the position of ch. v does not.

18. The observation of another duplicate here seems due to Rassow alone, who (*Forschungen*, p. 23) has pointed out that *ὁμοιον οὖν* . . .

¹ The same holds of the parallel formula *ἐν ἀρχῇ. τὰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς* (which however is not strictly parallel, compare the exx. referred to in Bonitz Ind.) relates in one place, Prior Anal. 32 a 34, to something in the same chapter, but the meaning is special: after considering the first group (syllogisms with universal premisses) of a logical order, in the second group (syllogisms with universal and particular premisses) a result is obtained identical with one which holds in the first; this is expressed by *καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς*, 'just as in the cases first in order:' and it is almost necessary to use some such phrase for precision, because it is immediately preceded by *πρότερον* which refers to a syllogism in the second group,—...*τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται συμπέρασμα δ καὶ πρότερον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς*, i. e. the conclusions of two syllogisms in the second group coincide, in the same manner as the conclusions of two in the first group.

² In B, and B, *νοσηματώδης* seems to include *διὰ νόσους*.

ἀρχή 1150 a 3-5 is parallel to παραπλήσιον οὖν . . . θηρίον 1150 a 6-8. The last passage is evidently a bungler's work, for the comparison συμβάλλειν ἀδικίαν πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἄδικον is an unfortunate substitute for ἀψυχον συμβάλλειν πρὸς ἐμψυχον, and can hardly be by the same author. It does not seem to belong to either of the other versions.

On the possible origin of such short duplicates, see paragr. 89.

SECTION V.

NIC. ETH. VII. x. § 4. (TABLES IV and V.)

19. The fourth section of the tenth chapter is made up of two pieces, each of which is parallel to a piece in another part of the book.

1st, *ἔστι δ' ἀκρασία . . . τῆς τῶν πλείστων δυνάμεως* (1152 a 25-27) is contained already, in a slightly different form, in ch. vii, § 1, *ἔστι μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν, κ.τ.λ.* 1150 a 11: see Table IV.

2nd, *εὐιατοτέρα δὲ τῶν ἀκρασιῶν, κ.τ.λ.* (1152 a 27-33) corresponds to ch. viii, § 2, *αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων . . . οἱ πολλοί*, 1151 a 1-5: see Table V.

20. The only way of avoiding the conclusion that the later passages are parallel versions of the former, seems to be to suppose them resumés, and put as such at the end of the treatise; at all events there seems no other reason assignable for the repetition of the subjects.

(a) But there is no reference in the later passages to those which have preceded, nor any consciousness that the subject has been treated before.

(β) The first passage in § 4, *ἔστι δ' ἀκρασία, κ.τ.λ.* though not in the form of a resumé, might, as regards its mere contents, be a resumé of a part (for it says nothing of *μαλακία* and *καρτερία*) of ch. vii, § 1.

But neither in form nor in content can the second passage *εὐιατοτέρα δὲ τῶν ἀκρασιῶν, κ.τ.λ.*, serve as a resumé of ch. viii, § 2.

Both treat of different degrees of culpability within *ἀκρασία*, but viii, 2 only recognises such a difference between two classes, the first where the *ἀκρατής* is carried away by his feeling before he has time to think, the second where he has reflected but nevertheless yields to temptation, ch. x, § 4 contains not only this, but adds a similar distinction between the *δι' ἐθισμοῦ ἀκρατεῖς* and the *φυσικοὶ ἀκρατεῖς*, as the latter are less curable than the former.

There is too a noteworthy change of phraseology in x, 4: for in accordance with vii, 8 the *ἀκρατεῖς* who act without reflection are called *μελαγχολικοί*; in viii, 2 *ἐκστατικοί*, a term not to be found in vii, 8 (see also paragr. 35).

Again, viii. 2 merely affirms that one kind of ἀκρασία is better than the other (βελτίους); in x. 4 the reason why the one is better than the other is given in εὐαιστέρα.

(γ) The context in ch. x. does not suit the hypothesis that the parts of § 4 are resums: §§ 1 and 2 are on the compatibility of ἀκρασία with φρόνησις and δεινότης, and are not recapitulatory; § 3, though beginning with something said before, introduces new subjects relative to ἀκρασία, and the contents of § 4 follow as though they were other new points. And generally, if the author intended to recapitulate his results here, he could scarcely have passed over so much that is important in the book, and have selected for repetition just these two things which form such an inconsiderable portion of the theory developed.

21. To sum up: from the form, matter, and context of the two passages, it seems to be naturally inferred that they are not recapitulations of the similar passages earlier in the book, and that they belong to parallel versions. This conclusion is confirmed by the results arrived at on stronger evidence in the repetitions already discussed. The duplicate of the second passage seems wrongly placed: compare paragraph 34.

SECTION VI.

NIC. ETH. VII. vii. (TABLE IV.)

22. (α) In § 1, A₁, the relation to one another of the ἀκρατής, μαλακός, ἐγκρατής, and καρτερικός, is determined. The first two of these yield (ἡττᾶσθαι) to the bad impulse, but, for the ἀκρατής, this is given by pleasure, for the μαλακός by pain. The last two agree so far as both overcome (κρατεῖν) the bad impulse, and differ, like the first two, in its nature.

κρατεῖν then is common to the ἐγκρατής and καρτερικός, ἡττᾶσθαι to the μαλακός and ἀκρατής. This is contradicted by § 4, 1150 a 32-b 1 (A₂), according to which κρατεῖν belongs to the ἐγκρατής alone, and not to the καρτερικός, whose action is merely ἀντέχειν: and this difference is made a reason for preferring the former to the latter, because κρατεῖν is better than μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι.

Two such opposite views cannot have been intended for the same context.

(β) § 2 (A₂, 1150 a 16), begins the subject quite independently and without any link of connection to § 1:—'Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐναι τῶν ἡδονῶν, κ.τ.λ.

ἀρχή 1150 a 3-5 is parallel to παραπλήσιον οὖν . . . θηρίον 1150 a 6-8. The last passage is evidently a bungler's work, for the comparison συμβάλλειν ἀδικίαν πρὸς ἀνθρώπον ἄδικον is an unfortunate substitute for ἀψυχον συμβάλλειν πρὸς ξμψυχον, and can hardly be by the same author. It does not seem to belong to either of the other versions.

On the possible origin of such short duplicates, see paragr. 89.

SECTION V.

NIC. ETH. VII. x. § 4. (TABLES IV and V.)

19. The fourth section of the tenth chapter is made up of two pieces, each of which is parallel to a piece in another part of the book.

1st, ἐστι δ' ἀκρασία . . . τῆς τῶν πλείστων δυνάμεως (1152 a 25-27) is contained already, in a slightly different form, in ch. vii, § 1, ἐστι μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν, κ.τ.λ. 1150 a 11 : see Table IV.

2nd, εὐιατοτέρα δὲ τῶν ἀκρασιῶν, κ.τ.λ. (1152 a 27-33) corresponds to ch. viii, § 2, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων . . . οἱ πολλοί, 1151 a 1-5 : see Table V.

20. The only way of avoiding the conclusion that the later passages are parallel versions of the former, seems to be to suppose them resumés, and put as such at the end of the treatise ; at all events there seems no other reason assignable for the repetition of the subjects.

(a) But there is no reference in the later passages to those which have preceded, nor any consciousness that the subject has been treated before.

(β) The first passage in § 4, ἐστι δ' ἀκρασία, κ.τ.λ. though not in the form of a resumé, might, as regards its mere contents, be a resumé of a part (for it says nothing of μαλακία and καρτερία) of ch. vii, § 1.

But neither in form nor in content can the second passage εὐιατοτέρα δὲ τῶν ἀκρασιῶν, κ.τ.λ., serve as a resumé of ch. viii, § 2.

Both treat of different degrees of culpability within ἀκρασία, but viii, 2 only recognises such a difference between two classes, the first where the ἀκρατής is carried away by his feeling before he has time to think, the second where he has reflected but nevertheless yields to temptation, ch. x, § 4 contains not only this, but adds a similar distinction between the δι' ἐθισμού ἀκρατεῖς and the φυσικοὶ ἀκρατεῖς, as the latter are less curable than the former.

There is too a noteworthy change of phraseology in x, 4 : for in accordance with vii, 8 the ἀκρατεῖς who act without reflection are called μελαγχολικοί ; in viii, 2 ἐκστατικοί, a term not to be found in vii, 8 (see also paragr. 35).

Again, viii. 2 merely affirms that one kind of ἀκρασία is better than the other (βελτίους); in x. 4 the reason why the one is better than the other is given in εὐιατοτέρα.

(γ) The context in ch. x. does not suit the hypothesis that the parts of § 4 are resumés: §§ 1 and 2 are on the compatibility of ἀκρασία with φρόνησις and δεινότης, and are not recapitulatory; § 3, though beginning with something said before, introduces new subjects relative to ἀκρασία, and the contents of § 4 follow as though they were other new points. And generally, if the author intended to recapitulate his results here, he could scarcely have passed over so much that is important in the book, and have selected for repetition just these two things which form such an inconsiderable portion of the theory developed.

21. To sum up: from the form, matter, and context of the two passages, it seems to be naturally inferred that they are not recapitulations of the similar passages earlier in the book, and that they belong to parallel versions. This conclusion is confirmed by the results arrived at on stronger evidence in the repetitions already discussed. The duplicate of the second passage seems wrongly placed: compare paragraph 34.

SECTION VI.

NIC. ETH. VII. vii. (TABLE IV.)

22. (α) In § 1, A₁, the relation to one another of the ἀκρατής, μαλακός, ἐγκρατής, and καρτερικός, is determined. The first two of these yield (ἡττᾶσθαι) to the bad impulse, but, for the ἀκρατής, this is given by pleasure, for the μαλακός by pain. The last two agree so far as both overcome (κρατεῖν) the bad impulse, and differ, like the first two, in its nature.

κρατεῖν then is common to the ἐγκρατής and καρτερικός, ἡττᾶσθαι to the μαλακός and ἀκρατής. This is contradicted by § 4, 1150 a 32-b 1 (A₂), according to which κρατεῖν belongs to the ἐγκρατής alone, and not to the καρτερικός, whose action is merely ἀντέχειν: and this difference is made a reason for preferring the former to the latter, because κρατεῖν is better than μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι.

Two such opposite views cannot have been intended for the same context.

(β) § 2 (A₂, 1150 a 16), begins the subject quite independently and without any link of connection to § 1:—'Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐνίαι τῶν ἡδονῶν, κ.τ.λ.

§ 2 seems to ignore § 1, for in the latter the kind of pleasure and pain which concern the characters under consideration is already formulated,—τὰς δι' ἀφῆς καὶ γεύσεως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας: but § 2 begins as though this were not yet done, and makes the same statement itself in a different form, substituting for αἱ δι' ἀφῆς καὶ γεύσεως the terms ἀναγκαῖαι (1150 a 16), and σωματικαί (1150 a 24).

(γ) One point remains in § 1, A₁,—ἔστι μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν . . . οἱ πολλοὶ ἥττους (1150 a 12–14), i.e. ἀκρασία and μαλακία are constituted not by yielding to any alike of the pleasures and pains of ἀφή and γεῦσις, but by yielding to those which most men overcome: ἐγκράτεια and καρτερία b^y overcoming not any alike, but those which most men yield to.

All this is given again in §§ 5 and 6, with the exchange of ἀντιτείνει for κρατεῖ in the case of καρτερία, in accordance with the peculiar doctrine (see a) of § 4; compare § 5, 1150 b 1, ὃ δ' ἐλλείπων πρὸς ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ ἀντιτείνουσι, κ.τ.λ. and § 6, 1150 b 6, ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἐγκράτειαν, κ.τ.λ., 1150 b 12–13, ἀλλ' εἴ τις, κ.τ.λ.

23. Since then one part of the substance of A₁ is contradicted by A₂, § 4 (a), and the other part is repeated in A₂, (β and γ): since the repetition of the common matter is made in § 5 with a difference of form agreeing with the difference of A₂, § 4, from A₁, (γ): and since A₂ has a regular beginning independent of A₁, (β): it may be inferred that §§ 2–7¹ form an independent chapter, and that § 1 is a parallel version of the same subject.

This conclusion is somewhat confirmed by another circumstance; A₂ gives as example of τρυφή, which is a kind of μαλακία, ὃς ἔλκει τὸ ἱμάτιον, ἵνα μὴ πονήσῃ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰρεῖν λύπην. Such a pain will not fit the formula of A₁, 1150 a 10, according to which μαλακία is connected only with the pains of ἀφή and γεῦσις, but may be included, with at least less obvious inconsistency, in the more elastic formula of A₂, 1150 a 24, σωματικαὶ λύπαι.

24. Now it has been shewn that ch. x, § 4, init. is a duplicate of ch. vii, § 1, ἔστι μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν, κ.τ.λ.; this again has its counterpart in another version, A₂, namely, §§ 5, 6, of ch. vii. (see above, γ): therefore these three passages may be three parallel versions, one at least, ch. x, § 4, being probably a fragment whose context has been lost.

¹ Excluding a part of § 3, for which see paragr. 77–78.

SECTION VII.

NIC. ETH. VII. iii. (TABLE I.)

25. This chapter has two independent beginnings, A (= § 1, 1146 b 8-14) and A' (= § 2, 1146 b 14-24), each giving the subjects to be discussed in the next part, and their order. Rassoow also has seen this much ; but the parallelism extends beyond, right through the chapter, and the versions are combined in a manner different from any of the preceding.

26. In the present order of the text there are two difficulties of structure, the first of which seems to have been passed over, and the second never really solved.

(a) In § 3 (B₁, 1146 b 24-27), *περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δόξαν, κ.τ.λ.* begins the answer to the question *πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὐ, καὶ πῶς εἰδότες*. There is no use, it is argued, in saying that the *ἀκρατής* has not knowledge, but only opinion ; for opinion may be as firmly held as knowledge, and therefore be as difficult to overcome.

From the *οὖν* at the beginning of the next section (B₂, 1146 b 27) either an inference would be expected to follow, or at least some new statement : instead of that, the same thing is repeated, and in very similar words : compare B₁ and B₂ in Table I.

(β) The second difficulty is the relation of § 5 (C₁), and §§ 7, 8 (C₂).

According to what seems the necessary meaning of the words, C₂ explains the difference of explicit (or actual) and implicit (or potential) knowledge, premising that it has *not been mentioned hitherto*—*ἐτι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων, κ.τ.λ.* But the distinction has been made already and very definitely in C₁, about fourteen lines above in the present text, with the same words (compare *ἔχων μὲν οὐ χρώμενος δέ* and *ἔχειν μὲν μὴ χρῆσθαι δέ*). Some have thought therefore that the intention in C₂ is to describe, not the difference of implicit from explicit knowledge in general, but a new species of implicit knowledge, distinct from what has been given (*ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων*), and defined by the examples *καθεύδων, μαινώμενος, οἰνωμένος*. It may be doubted whether this explanation would ever have been thought of, had it not been for the supposed necessity of reconciling C₁ and C₂, for it does not seem to suit either passage.

(i) If *ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων* referred to § 5 (C₁), that section must also be the description of a particular kind of implicit

knowledge; but it is a description of implicit knowledge in general, not of a particular species; in the words ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ διχῶς λέγομεν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι, κ.τ.λ. knowledge in general is divided into explicit and implicit, characterized by the generic terms *χρώμενος* and *ἔχων μὲν οὐ χρώμενος* δέ, common to both C_1 and C_2 . The reference cannot be to D_1 , as that only uses the general notion of potentiality (οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ) given in C_1 : comp. also parag. 27 fin.

(ii) If the second passage, C_2 , announces a new kind of implicit knowledge, the beginning should rather be *ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν μὲν μὴ χρῆσθαι* δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις: the words *ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην* would naturally introduce a division of *ἔχειν* in general, not of a particular species of *ἔχειν*.

(iii) ὁ καθεύδων, ὁ μαινόμενος, &c. might be given as examples of a particular kind of implicit knowledge, but they might also be meant to illustrate the abeyance of knowledge in general, and the latter seems to be really the case in this passage. For οἷον in such construction (ὥστε καὶ ἔχειν (τινὰ) πῶς καὶ μὴ ἔχειν, οἷον τὸν καθεύδοντα καὶ μαινόμενον, κ.τ.λ.) = *exempli gratia*, and does not introduce the completion of a definition, but only illustrations of a definition which is complete and has preceded: but all that has preceded is *τὸ ἔχειν μὲν μὴ χρῆσθαι* δέ—ὥστε *ἔχειν πῶς καὶ μὴ ἔχειν*, 'to have and not use,—so as to have in a sense, and yet not have,' attributes common to implicit knowledge in general, and not marking a species. The meaning then of the last clause seems to be, 'so that a man may have knowledge in a sense, and yet not have it, of which the drunken man and the madman are instances.' *διαφέρουσιν* takes up *ἄλλον τρόπον*, and the sense of the whole passage is, 'Again, it is possible, to "have" knowledge in a different way from what has been spoken of; for where knowledge is had and not used, the "having" is of a different sort, so that it is in a sense both having and not having, as happens in sleep or drunkenness.' See also below, parag. 30, fin.

27. The cause of the above difficulties probably is that § 4 (B_2) is a parallel version of § 3 (B_1); and §§ 7, 8, C_2 , of § 5 (C_1).

And this conclusion is made almost certain by the parallelism of the remaining parts of the chapter.

The whole may be arranged in two parallel columns, as in Table I:—

A' (§ 2, 1146 b 14–24) is the duplicate of A (§ 1, 1146 b 8–14).

B_2 (§ 2, 1146 b 27–31) of B_1 (§ 3, 1146 b 24–27).

C_2 (§§ 7, 8, 1147 a 10–24) of C_1 (§ 5, 1146 b 31–35).

D_2 (§§ 9–12, 1147 a 24–b 9) of D_1 (§ 6, 1146 b 35–1147 a 10).

To D_1 should perhaps be added §§ 13 and 14, 1147 b 9-17: see paragraph 69.

A' and A, as already said, give each a table of contents.

The rest discuss the problem 'how can the ἀκρατής act against knowledge?'

B_1 and B_2 both reject the solution that the ἀκρατής has only δόξα.

In ($C_1 D_1$) and ($C_2 D_2$) the answer is that his knowledge is only implicit, not explicit.

C_1 and C_2 expound the distinction of potential and actual knowledge.

D_1 and D_2 apply that distinction to the action of the ἀκρατής through the practical syllogism.

28. B_1 and B_2 resemble one another closely: so do C_1 and C_2 , for though C_2 is much longer, it is essentially the same as C_1 , the new part being only in the way of explanation and illustration: compare the relation of C_1 and C_2 in chapter iv. (paragraph 8, β).

A' differs considerably from A as to the scheme of the subjects (compare below paragraphs 29, 61), and in such a way as seems to make it certain that the two passages do not belong to the same version but are independent duplicates.

D_2 and D_1 also differ considerably in the treatment of their common subject, as is of course possible in parallel versions: compare the relation of the first version to the second and third in chaps. v, vi (Table III and paragraph 51), of the first and second versions in ch. vii. (Table IV and paragraph 55), and of many parts of the Nicomachean Ethics to the corresponding ones of the Eudemian. The presence of ἐπιθυμία in the ἀκρατής is mentioned in D_2 but not in D_1 : however, the very question which D_1 answers—'how can the incontinent man act from an impulse contrary to his conviction?' presupposes that the impulse is ἐπιθυμία. If §§ 13 and 14, 1147 b 9-17, belong to D_1 (as conjectured), then this is expressed also by δ ἐν τῇ πάθει ὄν, 1147 b 11. The real addition in D_2 is what seems to be an attempt to explain how ἐπιθυμία contributes to the abeyance of knowledge; but the author scarcely gets beyond the statement of the fact, and seems confusedly to represent the potential knowledge that the course chosen is wrong as making an active resistance.

The three passages in D_2 , ὥστε συμβαίνει, κ.τ.λ. 1147 b 1-3, ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, κ.τ.λ. 1147 b 3-5, πῶς δὲ λύεται, κ.τ.λ. 1147 b 6-9, have nothing to correspond in D_1 : but they are not absolutely necessary to the subject of the chapter. The main issue being to account for action against reason (λόγος),—irrational action, the writer goes off

in the first of the above passages to a consideration which does not help the solution of the real problem: his account of the practical syllogism suggests to him that in a sense the *ἀκπαρής* acts *with* reason, and not altogether irrationally, because he reasons in a syllogism about what he does. This addition, as well as that about animals in the second passage, and the reawakening of knowledge in the third, do not disprove the parallelism of D_2 and D_1 .

29. The beginning A (§ 1) of the chapter fits equally to either of the versions ($B_1 C_1 D_1$), ($B_2 C_2 D_2$), but its duplicate, A', fits neither; for it proposes to start with the question as to whether the incontinent and continent man are differentiated by their objects, or their relation to their objects, or both together ($\tau\omega\ \pi\epsilon\rho\iota\ \delta\ \eta\ \tau\omega\ \pi\omega\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\chi\omicron\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma\ \tau\eta\nu\ \delta\iota\alpha\phi\omicron\rho\acute{\alpha}\nu$, κ.τ.λ. 1146 b 14-18): see also paragraph 61. A' then may belong to a third version, and it will be seen hereafter (paragraph 61) that this conjecture is not without some further confirmation.

The order then of the text being A, A', B_1 , B_2 , C_1 , D_1 , C_2 , D_2 , the combinations, A $B_1 C_1 D_1$, A $B_2 C_2 D_2$, are equally coherent, and each gives the same general result as the other.

It seems to follow too that the compiler having before him, in whatever form, parts of two or three versions of the same subject, with corresponding members, A' and A, B_1 and B_2 , [$C_1 D_1$] and [$C_2 D_2$], instead of writing the members of one version together in their proper order, and then those of another in theirs, associated corresponding parts of different versions; so that A' follows upon A, B_2 upon B_1 , and [$C_2 D_2$] upon [$C_1 D_1$]: see Introduction, paragr. 3.

30. The above resolution of the text removes all difficulty from the relation of C_1 and C_2 , for in the version to which C_2 belongs nothing has been said yet about potential knowledge, C_1 and D_1 being parts of a different version. The words $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu\ \tau\rho\acute{o}\pi\omicron\nu\ \tau\omega\nu\ \nu\acute{\upsilon}\nu\ \rho\eta\theta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\tau\omega\nu$, 1147 a 10-11, refer to what has preceded in B_2 ; there the only kinds of 'having' belief are having it doubtfully or having it certainly, in each of these the 'having' being actual, C_2 adds the case where the 'having' is potential.

The word $\tau\rho\acute{o}\pi\omicron\nu\varsigma$ at the end of D_1 perhaps led the compiler to place C_2 after D_1 , compare paragr. 34 fin. and 87. $\tau\rho\acute{o}\pi\omicron\nu$ in the second version was doubtless suggested by $\tau\rho\acute{o}\pi\omicron\nu\varsigma$ in the first; for it will be seen in the Tables that the language of one version often echoes that of the other in a slightly altered form; compare e.g. in this chapter $\omicron\upsilon\theta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \delta\iota\omicron\lambda\omicron\upsilon\sigma\epsilon\iota\ \acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}\mu\eta\ \delta\acute{o}\xi\eta\varsigma$ of B_2 , with $\omicron\upsilon\theta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \delta\iota\alpha\phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\iota\ \pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\nu\ \lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\nu$ of B_1 ; a similar relation holds throughout the language of B_1 and B_2 .

The parallelism of the clause ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ διχῶς . . . ἔχων μὲν οὐ χρώμενος δὲ . . . διόλσει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ . . . πράττειν τοῦ ἔχοντα (C₁) τοῦ γὰρ τῷ ἔχειν μὲν μὴ χρῆσθαι δὲ διαφέρουσιν ὁρῶμεν τὴν ἕξιν (C₂), confirms the meaning ascribed to διαφέρουσιν above (paragraph 26).

31. Another apparently erroneous view caused by the supposition that the chapter is a whole must be noticed. It has been said that B₁ and C₁ do not refer to ἀκρασία, and that the words δηλον οὖν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἔχειν λεκτέον τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς τούτοις, § 7 fin. 1147 a 17, shew that the state of the ἀκρατής is first discussed in C₂ (§§ 7, 8). This would be strange in itself, and seems to be disproved by the sentence in C₁, 1146 b 33-5, διόλσει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ ἂ μὴ δεῖ πράττειν τοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα· τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖ δεινὸν ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰ μὴ θεωρῶν, and the inference in D₁, κατὰ τε δὴ τούτους διόλσει τοὺς τρόπους ἀμήχανον ὅσον ὥστε δοκεῖν οὕτω μὲν εἰδέναι μηθὲν ἄτοπον, ἄλλως δὲ θαναμαστόν: for these mean that the distinctions made remove the apparent paradox (compare δεινόν, ἄτοπον, θαναμαστόν) that the ἀκρατής acts against his knowledge: for this is *the* paradox which is before the writer, as is evident both from A and B₁.

The principles then laid down in C₁ and D₁ are intended for application to the case of the ἀκρατής: If the text of D₁ is complete, this would be implied obviously enough: but it seems not impossible that the text of D₁ is incomplete (see paragraph 69) and should be supplemented by §§ 13, 14; in that case the latter passage makes the application in express terms (69 fin.).

32. At the beginning of D₂, § 9, 1147 a 24, φυσικῶς seems to have the meaning discussed by Waitz, Org. vol. ii. p. 354, and is equivalent to ἀναλυτικῶς as opposed to λογικῶς: because in C₂ a general account (λογικῶς) is given of dormant or potential knowledge in the ἀκρατής and others (ὁ καθεύδων, &c.), while in D₂ the attendant circumstances are more accurately analysed which belong to the essence of the particular case considered (ἀναλυτικῶς, φυσικῶς)—the action of the ἀκρατής.

PART III.

OTHER EVIDENCE OF COMPILATION.

SECTION I.

NIC. ETH. VII. vii. § 8, and viii. §§ 1, 2, 3.

33. Up to the seventh chapter, the subjects of the book have been put in a regular connection, outwardly at least, by transitional passages.

These are:—

Ch. ii. § 1, 1145 b 20, τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ταῦτ' ἐστίν· ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις, κ.τ.λ., which connects chs. i. and ii.

Ch. ii. § 12, 1146 b 6, αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαι τοιαῦταί τινες συμβαίνουσιν, τούτων δὲ πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, κ.τ.λ., which connects chs. ii. and iii.

Ch. iv. § 1, 1147 b 17, περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ εἰδῶτα τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω, πότερον δέ, κ.τ.λ., which connects chs. iii. and iv.

(Ch. v. succeeds ch. iv. without such definite juncture, but still without abruptness).

Ch. v. § 9, 1148 a 21, ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία . . . ὅτι δὲ καὶ . . . κ.τ.λ., which connects ch. v., the first account of unnatural vices, with the discussion of ἀκρασία θυμοῦ in ch. vi.

Ch. vi. § 5, 1149 b 23, ὥς μὲν τοῖσιν αἰσχίων . . . αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων, κ.τ.λ., which connects ch. vi. §§ 1-4 with the second account of unnatural vice.

There is no summing up at the end of ch. vi., yet ch. vii. is introduced sufficiently by its opening words.

But at the beginning of ch. vii. § 8 this systematic method is interrupted, perhaps because the materials are now more fragmentary.

After μαλακία (vii. 1-7) a return is made to ἀκρασία, and a classification of it into two kinds begun abruptly without any transition, 1150 b 19. This again is succeeded with equal abruptness in ch. viii. § 1, 1150 b 29, by a new subject, a difference between ἀκολασία and ἀκρασία, which is used to solve a former ἀπορία.

34. In ch. viii, 1150 b 29 seqq., there is a certain unity of interest, the discrimination of ἀκρασία from ἀκολασία, which is common to §§ 1, 3, 4 and 5, and for this reason they may have been put together: there is however no announcement of subject; the five sections of the chapter have, with the exception perhaps of the first and third, no real organic connection, and can scarcely have been intended originally to stand in their present relation.

The object of § 1 is to point out the fundamental difference of the ἀκρατής and ἀκόλαστος—'the former feels remorse and is therefore curable, the latter does not and is incurable; generally (ὅλως) they are different in kind, the ἀκρατής knows that his conduct is wrong, the ἀκόλαστος does not.' § 3 continues this line of thought and adds to the difference between the two certain points of likeness; § 2 breaks the continuity of this context, for whereas the subject is the distinction between ἀκολασία and ἀκρασία it goes off quite irrelevantly to a difference between the two kinds of ἀκρασία which have been described in the last section of the preceding chapter (vii. 8).

The words αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων, at the beginning of § 2, ought to refer to the characters ἀκρατής and ἀκόλαστος, which are the subject throughout § 1, since no transition has been made from them to the ἀκρατεῖς, but, as already said, they obviously refer to the latter alone.

It seems impossible then that § 2 can be in its original context. See also paragraphs 19–21 and 54.

The statement in § 1 that the ἀκρατής is curable (ίαρός) and the ἀκόλαστος not, may have suggested to the compiler to put near to it the passage (§ 2) on a similar difference between the two kinds of ἀκρασία. It is true that the distinguishing word in the latter case is 'better' (βελτίους), not 'more curable,' but in the duplicate of § 2 (see Table V.) εὐιαστοτέρα is actually found and—if it be not passing all reasonable limits of conjecture—this word may have originally suggested connecting the duplicates at all with this place, while the compiler may have selected vii. 2 rather than x. 4, because he thought the latter from the nature of the additions in it would interrupt the context too seriously. He may then have put the one chosen where it is, 1151 a 1, because this is the nearest place to the remark on the curability of the ἀκρατής where it could be inserted: and the word ἀκρασία (ἥ δὲ ἀκρασία οὐ λανθάνει) may have seemed to give the requisite meaning to αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων. Perhaps the last words are his own erroneous attempt to alter or restore the beginning of § 2 so as to fit the place. The phrase has occurred already 1149 b 25, and in Eud. Eth. III. iv. 5.

SECTION II.

NIC. ETH. VII. viii. §§ 2 and 5.

35. There is evidence that viii. 2 and viii. 5 were not intended for the same context.

In § 2 :—

(i) *ἐκστατικοί* does not refer to the whole of *ἀκρασία* but to the characteristic of the particular species described as *προπέτεια* in vii. 8, and is applied to persons of passionate or vehement temperament.

(ii) So also *οἱ τὸν λόγον ἔχοντες μὴ ἐμμένοντες* δέ are not *ἀκραεῖς* in general, but the particular species *ἀσθενεῖς* of vii. 8.

(iii) Thus then the terms *ἐκστατικοί* and *μὴ ἐμμένοντες*, κ.τ.λ. are opposed, as denoting different species of the same genus.

In § 5 (see Table VI) these distinctions are not recognised: on the contrary, the passages, 1151 a 26, *ὁ ἐμμενετικός καὶ οὐκ ἐκστατικός διὰ γε τὸ πάθος* of the *ἐγκρατής*, and 1151 a 20, *ἔστι δέ τις διὰ πάθος ἐκστατικός παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον*, shew :—

(i) That *ἐκστατικός* is used to characterize all *ἀκρασία* as such, not a particular species of it; and merely = ‘not abiding by one’s rational conviction.’

(ii) That *μὴ ἐμμενετικός* (= *ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων μὴ ἐμμένων* δέ) also characterizes all *ἀκρασία* and not a species.

(iii) That the terms *ἐκστατικοί* and *μὴ ἐμμενετικοί* are identical and not opposed to one another.

Such contrary usages can hardly have been intended by an author to stand in the same treatise, much less in the same chapter.

The relation of *ἐκστατικός* to *ἐμμενετικός* and *μὴ ἐμμενετικός* in § 5 is the same as that found in the rest of the book (except of course § 2 of this chapter): see i. 6 (1145 b 10–11), ii. 7 (1146 a 16–18), ix. 1 (1151 b 3–4). Compare also for *μὴ ἐμμένειν* as attribute of all *ἀκρασία*, ix. 1 (1151 a 30–31, 35), ix. 5 (1151 b 25–26), ix. 4 (1151 b 17 seqq.), x. 4 (1152 a 26), and viii. 1 (1150 b 30), where the same seems implied. In the following *μὴ ἐμμένοντες* and kindred expressions are applied to a particular species of *ἀκρασία*, but not opposed to *ἐκστατικοί*, vii. 8 (1150 b 20), x. 3 (1152 a 18), x. 4 (1152 a 29), the duplicate of viii. 2.

For a more dubious resolution of the text, see paragraphs 72–75.

SECTION III.

NIC. ETH. VII. x. 3.

36. The passage ix. 6, -x. 2, 1151 b 32-1152 a 14, is to a certain extent a whole, because three opinions, mentioned in the list of ch. i. § 6, 1145 b 8 seqq., are examined: (1) that the *σώφρων* is *ἐγκρατής*; (2) that *ἀκρατής* and *ἀκόλαστος* are interchangeable terms; (3) that the *φρόνιμος* may be *ἀκρατής*.

(a) In the next passage, § 3, 1152 a 14 seqq., the interest passes abruptly to the *ἀκρατής* alone.—‘The *ἀκρατής* has not fully conscious knowledge. Though his act is voluntary—for he knows its nature in a way—yet he is not completely wicked, his deliberate conviction is in favour of the good. Nor is he completely unjust (though his conduct may be injurious), for he does not act with malice aforethought. He has good inclinations but does not follow them, like a city which has good laws and does not obey them.’ The drift of this is clearly not continuous with the previous discussion of the three opinions in general, nor with the last part of it (q.v.) as to whether the *φρόνιμοι* or *δεινοί* can be *ἀκρατεῖς*, yet it is introduced in such a manner as to presuppose continuity—*οὐδὲ δὴ ὥς ὁ εἰδώς καὶ θεωρῶν*.

(β) Again, these words, with which is usually understood *πράττει ὁ ἀκρατής*, or the like, imply a close grammatical connection with the preceding sentence, that *ὁ ἀκρατής* is the principal subject, and that the principal verb or verbal expression is akin to *πράττει*. But the sentence *τὸν δὲ δεινὸν . . . προαίρεσιν*, 1152 a 10-14, does not satisfy this condition and has no connection with *οὐδὲ δὴ ὥς ὁ εἰδώς καὶ θεωρῶν*. It might be objected that this clause refers to 1152 a 8, *ἔτι οὐ τῷ εἰδέναι μόνον φρόνιμος ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πρακτικός· ὁ δ’ ἀκρατής οὐ πρακτικός*: in that case *τὸν δὲ δεινὸν . . . προαίρεσιν* must be in a parenthesis, which seems too harsh to be possible; besides, the words *οὐδὲ δὴ* should, after so long an interruption, be parallel to *ἔτι οὐ*, so that *ὁ φρόνιμος* should be the subject meant by *ὁ εἰδώς*, which is of course impossible; and the former objection (a) holds of what follows.

From the foregoing, and from what has been said of § 4 (paragr. 19-21), it seems probable that the end of the book is made of pieces not belonging to each other. From its subject, § 3 may have followed a comparison of the *ἀκρατής* and the *ἀκόλαστος*, such as that in ix. 7, 1152 a 4; if this did precede § 3, perhaps the beginning of § 3 is imperfect.

PART IV.

ON THE ORDER AND AUTHORSHIP OF THE PARALLEL VERSIONS.

SECTION I.

NIC. ETH. VII. iv. (TABLE II.)

37. The style of the two versions in the chapter differs in a marked manner.

The first column ($B_1 C_1 D_1$) reads smoothly and easily, and seems as worthy of Aristotle as anything that is ascribed to him. The structure of the whole passage is perspicuous, and the divisions of the thought are distinguished by appropriate particles. In § 2, 1147 b 23 seqq., the clause beginning with *ἐπεὶ* (= 'whereas') is answered by the whole clause *ἀναγκαῖα μὲν . . . ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων*: this latter is divided into two clauses, distinguished by *μὲν* and *δέ*, *ἀναγκαῖα μὲν τὰ σωματικά . . . τὰ δὲ ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὗ, αἰρετὰ δὲ κ.τ.λ.* The *τοὺς μὲν*, referring to the *ἀκρατεῖς κατὰ πρόσθεσιν*, at the beginning of C_1 , is answered by *τοὺς δέ*, referring to the *ἀκρατεῖς ἀπλῶς*, at the beginning of D_1 .

On the other hand, the second column ($B_2 C_2 D_2$) is obscurely and awkwardly expressed in every part. In B_2 the meaning is perplexed by the insertion of the parenthesis *τῶν γὰρ ἡδέων . . . πρότερον*, containing the classification of pleasures, which should rather have been put in a principal clause, as in B_1 . The result is a sort of anacoluthon¹, for through the intervention of *ἡδέα* in the parenthesis, *χρήματα νίκη* and *τιμὴ* appear as examples of *ἡδοναί* and *ἐπιθυμιαί*.

C_2 and D_2 (§§ 5, 6, *διὸ ὅσοι μὲν . . . κέρδους φαμέν*, 1148 a 28—1148 b 14) are well known for their puzzling syntax: even in good editions the main apodosis is placed wrongly. It is worthy of remark

¹ Punctuations different to that given in Table II only change the place of this anacoluthon, and make the sentence much harsher.

that it seems possible to find a way through these difficulties¹ by an inspection of the perfect structure of the parallel passages C_1 and D_1 . Thus the clause *μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία κ.τ.λ.* in C_2 is in the same grammatical position as *ἀπλῶς μὲν οὐ λέγομεν ἀκρατεῖς* in C_1 , and cannot therefore be the apodosis (or indeed an apodosis at all) to *διὸ ὅσοι μὲν κ.τ.λ.* the main protasis; but is on the contrary subordinate to it, just as *ἀπλῶς μὲν οὐ λέγομεν κ.τ.λ.* in C_1 is subordinate to the main protasis *τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα κ.τ.λ.* (1147 b 31): for the same reason *μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν* does not resume the construction *διὸ ὅσοι μὲν κ.τ.λ.* Again, as *ἀπλῶς μὲν οὐ λέγομεν ἀκρατεῖς* (C_1) is answered by *προστιθέντες δὲ τὸ χρημάτων κ.τ.λ.* καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητά, so in C_2 *μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία* ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ ἀκρασία κ.τ.λ. has for apodosis *δι' ὁμοιότητα δὲ τοῦ πάθους προσεπιτιθέντες κ.τ.λ.* (comp. 1149 a 16): ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ ἀκρασία is a part of the protasis, and *φαῦλαι δὲ κ.τ.λ.* is a qualification of the clause of the protasis which has preceded it.

In C_2 , *διὸ ὅσοι μὲν κ.τ.λ.* is parallel to *τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα κ.τ.λ.* at the beginning of C_1 : the apodosis of the latter is at the beginning of D_1 , *τῶν δὲ περὶ τὰς κ.τ.λ.* This shews that the apodosis in thought to the former is in D_2 , and that there is no grammatical apodosis at all, the construction being quite changed at the words *ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα* at the beginning of D_2 .

Beside this anacoluthon there is in C_2 another. *Διὸ ὅσοι μὲν κ.τ.λ.* should have been followed by *μοχθηροὶ μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶ, ὁμοίως δ' οὐδὲ ἀκρατεῖς* instead of *μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία ὁμοίως δ' οὐδὲ ἀκρασία*, but the construction is lost through the digression beginning at *καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν*.

In D_2 the style is awkwardly brief; the sentence *ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα . . . ἀκολασία*, requires a good deal of filling up to make it grammatically coherent: this may be done in some such way as the following; *ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακίαν εἶναι ἐκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνάλογον [εἶναι] ὁμοίαν, [οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγουσι κακοὺς], οὕτω δὴλον ὅτι ἀκατεῖ [οὐ λεκτέον ἀπλῶς ἀκρασίαν, ἀλλ'] ἐποληπτέον μόνην ἀκρασίαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν εἶναι ἥτις κ.τ.λ.*

The monotonous use of the genitive plural of the adjective, with classifying force, instead of an inflexion agreeing with the noun, sometimes needlessly, should be noticed:—*αἱ μὲν εἰσι τῷ γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων*, 1148 a 23:—*διώκουσι τῶν φύσει τι καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν*, 1148 a 29:—*φύσει τῶν αἰρετῶν ἕκαστόν ἐστι δι' αὐτό*, 1148 b 3:—*ἡ γὰρ*

¹ For a statement of them see e.g. Rassow (Forsch., p. 130-1), whose solution is different.

ἀκρασία οὐ μόνον φευκτὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν, 1148 b 5:—καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, 1148 a 31.

38. 'Eudemeanisms,' or rather what might be claimed as such by those who advocate the Eudemean origin of this book, seem only to be found in the second column and not in the first.

(α) For instance: instead of the phrase αἰρετὰ καθ' αὐτά in the first version, the second version gives φύσει αἰρετά, φύσει αἰρετὰ δι' αὐτά, φύσει καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ, which may be compared with Eudemean Ethics, Book VIII, 1248 b 16—1249 b 3, where ἀγαθὰ φύσει occurs six times with the same meaning as ἀγαθὰ φύσει and αἰρετὰ φύσει here, and with the examples τιμή and πλοῦτος among others (1248 b 28).

(β) In the second version these ἡδέα are said also to be φύσει καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ, and the ἡδοναί, τῷ γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων. Such an addition of καλός to ἀγαθός is characteristic of some parts at least of the Eudemean Ethics: the author of which prefers to call the ideal man καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός, and his excellence καλοκαγαθία. In the passage from the Eudemean Ethics just referred to (1248 b 16—1249 b 3) the association of καλός with ἀγαθός is made throughout. On the other hand, the φύσει ἀγαθὰ are asserted in that passage not to be καλὰ in the ordinary case: but yet as the author says that to the ideal man, καλῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, the φύσει ἀγαθὰ are also καλὰ, this is compatible with the expression here, τῷ γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων: for the alternative, φύσει καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ, shews that τῷ γένει καλῶν (—) is equivalent in sense to φύσει καλὰ, which means not absolutely καλὰ, but καλὰ in the normal and right use, just as φύσει ἀγαθὰ in this and some other places means not absolutely good, but good under normal circumstances.

(γ) The second version adds to the example of the higher class of pleasant objects given in the first, νίκη, τιμή, and πλοῦτος, two new ones, τέκνα and γονεῖς: there is a similar addition in Eudemean Ethics, 1249 a 10, for εὐγένεια is given along with πλοῦτος and τιμή as an example of φύσει ἀγαθὰ. Compare however the examples of ἐκτός ἀγαθὰ in Nic. Eth. I. viii. 16, εὐγένεια, εὐτεκνία.

(δ) The addition of illustrations, Niobe, Satyrus, κακὸς ἰατρός, κακὸς ὑποκριτής, is quite in the manner of the Eudemean Ethics: in that work there is a fondness for adding to the Aristotelian examples, and sometimes short allusions in the Nicomachean Ethics are expanded into anecdotes.

(ε) The style of the Eudemean Ethics is not unfrequently perplexed. The awkward use of parenthesis in B₂ (1148 a 23, seqq.) may be compared with Eud. Eth. II, ix init., 1225 b 1—5: and the brevity

already noted in D₂ (see par. 30 fin.) and B₂ is akin to that of 'Eudemus,' for the expression does not get from it vigour and point, but rather needless obscurity.

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(β) Fritzsche has noticed that the words *ἀλέα* and *ψῆχος* are to be found again in Eud. Eth. 1229 b 5, but not elsewhere in the Nicomachean books. They occur however in a different context, and their usage here disagrees as much with the Eudemian as the Nicomachean Ethics.

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Compare Nic. Eth. III. xi. 5, 6, 1118 b 28–1119 a 5:—

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σώφρων ἀκόλαστος δὲ τῷ μῇ, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος τῷ
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(καὶ τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ ἡδονή), ὁ δὲ σώφρων τῷ

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μη λυπεῖσθαι τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ ἡδέος.
ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀκόλαστος ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἡδέων πάντων ἢ
τῶν μάλιστα, καὶ ἄγεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὥστε ἀντὶ τῶν
ἄλλων ταῦθ' αἰρεῖσθαι· διὸ καὶ λυπεῖται καὶ ἀποτυγχά-
νων καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἢ ἐπιθυμίας· ἀτόπως
δ' ἔοικε τὸ δι' ἡδονὴν λυπεῖσθαι.

But this chapter (iv of bk. VII) gives as examples of pains within the sphere of *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀκολασία* (compare 1148 a 5-9 with 1148 a 15), *πείνα*, *δίψα*, *ἀλέα*, and *ψῦχος*. The last two¹ of these are obviously excluded by the definition of bk. III: they are not pains caused merely by the desire for pleasure; it cannot be said of them, *τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ ἢ ἡδονή*.

Two other passages in Nic. Eth. III, show how much stress the author laid on the exclusion of all pains originating independently of imagined pleasure. Ch. x, § 1, 1117 b 24-27 :—

"Οτι μὲν
οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς ἢ σωφροσύνη, εἴρηται ἡμῖν·
ἦττον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας· ἐν τοῖς
αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία φαίνεται.

i.e. it is primarily of pleasure, and only secondarily of pain, so far as pain may be 'caused by pleasure.'

Ch. xii, §§ 1, 2, 1119 a 21-25 :—

Ἐκουσίῳ δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἡ ἀκολασία τῆς δειλίας.
ἢ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἡδονήν, ἢ δὲ διὰ λύπην, ὧν τὸ μὲν αἰρετόν,
τὸ δὲ φευκτόν. καὶ ἢ μὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι καὶ φθείρει τὴν
τοῦ ἔχοντος φύσιν, ἢ δὲ ἡδονὴ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ποιεῖ, μᾶλλον
δ' ἐκούσιον· διὸ καὶ ἐπονειδιστότερον.

If the account of *σωφροσύνη* in the Eudemean Ethics (III, ii), which answers to the above part of Nic. Eth. III, showed the same deviation from the Nicomachean version as bk. VII, ch. iv, there would be some ground perhaps for referring the last to the author of Eud. Eth. II. But, on the contrary, the Eudemean account (II, ii), follows the Nicomachean (III, x, xi), in mentioning 'no other pain as object of *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀκολασία* save that of unsatisfied desire for pleasure: compare Eud. Eth. 1231 a 30-32 :—

¹ The same is true really, though it does not concern the present argument, of the first two if caused by a physical want (where pain is the first thing in consciousness), and not merely by imagining the pleasures of eating and drinking (where imagined pleasure is the first thing in consciousness).

Καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐδὲ λέγονται ἀκόλαστοι· οὐ γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ χαίρειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ τυγχάνοντες καὶ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ μὴ τυγχάνοντες.

The pains of ἀλγία and ψύχη are referred to (Eud. Eth. 1229 b 5) in the chapter on ἀνδρεία, and not in any connection with σωφροσύνη and ἀκολασία, but associated with the objects of ἀνδρεία and δειλία. Eud. Eth. 1229 b 1-10:—

Διὸ καὶ σφόδρα τινὲς ὄντες μαλακοὶ περὶ ἕνια ἀνδρείοι εἰσι, καὶ ἔνιοι σκληροὶ καὶ καρτερικοὶ καὶ δειλοί. καὶ δὴ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν ἴδιον τῆς ἀνδρείας εἶναι τὸ περὶ τὸν θάνατον καὶ τὴν τοῦτου λύπην ἔχειν πῶς· εἰ γάρ τις εἴη τοιοῦτος οἷος πρὸς ἀλγίας καὶ ψύχῃ καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας λύπας ὑπομενετικός, ὥς ὁ λόγος, ἀκινδύνους οὖσας, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θάνατον καὶ μαλακὸς καὶ περίφοβος . . . ἐκείνος μὲν ἂν εἶναι δόξειε δειλός, κ.τ.λ.

Compare also 1229 b 19, where θερμά and ψυχρά are mentioned in a context about φοβερὰ.

The passage last quoted (1229 b 1-10) ranks καρτερία and μαλακία with ἀνδρεία and δειλία: so in Nic. Eth. III. vii. 13, μαλακία appears as a sort of δειλία, 1116 a 12-14:—

Τὸ δ' ἀποθνήσκειν φεύγοντα πενίαν ἢ ἔρωτα ἢ τι λυπηρὸν οὐκ ἀνδρείου, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δειλοῦ· μαλακία γὰρ τὸ φεύγειν τὰ ἐπίπουνα, κ.τ.λ.:

but neither the earlier Eudæmian, nor the earlier Nicomachean accounts of σωφροσύνη and ἀκολασία (Eud. Eth. II, Nic. Eth. III), connect μαλακία and καρτερία with them.

40. In subject matter the second version, as already seen, expands the main statements of the first. The additions in B₂ and C₂ seem a true advance: for example, the sentence πρὸς ἅπαντα δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα . . . ὑπερβάλλειν, commented on above in paragraph 8 a, is a valuable change of the ἔχοντα ὑπερβολήν of the first version, being an attempt to formulate more precisely the relation of the pleasures spoken of to morality.

So also the introduction in B₂ of the third class, τὰ ἐναντία τούτων, may be the result of an advanced view of the objects of unnatural indulgence as not being all σωματικά, and therefore not all included in the twofold division into φύσει αἰρετά and σωματικά. The new matter in C₂ seems the result of afterthought, and the remark on μοχθηρία (see paragraph 8 β. fin.) would hardly have been left out in rewriting.

Of two versions of the same subject, the more advanced may be by the same author as the other, and written when his mind has developed further: but, among other alternatives, it is possible also that the advance may be the work of another and even inferior writer, representing merely the general progress of philosophy since the first author, or the advantage which the second author had in having the works of the first before him. The latter hypothesis will be the more probable, if, while the advance is such as might be made by an inferior thinker under the conditions aforesaid, there are found real traces of inferior philosophic ability in the second version. And the inference will be much strengthened if there is a considerable falling off in style.

By such an argument it may be proved that the Eudemian Ethics are not by the author of the Nicomachean. The former treatise shews an advance especially in the consciousness of problems which the latter does not raise, and cannot answer adequately, as for instance in the account of the Voluntary. But there is clear evidence that the author of the Eudemian Ethics has a far less powerful mind than the author of the Nicomachean, who could not, humanly speaking, have made such mistakes as the so-called 'Eudemus.' Nor can this be explained away by making the Eudemian Ethics an earlier work by the author of the Nicomachean, for the advance in the Eudemian could not have been retraced by the same author.

41. In the case of the second of the two versions now under discussion, though the improvement is such as would in all probability not be retraced by the same author if once made, it is not too great to be due to the less able philosopher reflecting on the work of the abler. And on the other hand there do seem to be marks of less ability.

B₁ begins with a division of objects causing pleasure (*ποιούντα ἡδονήν*), B₂ with a division of pleasures (*ἡδοναί*) and appetites (*ἐπιθυμιαί*). The object of B₁ also is to classify pleasures, but the author uses advisedly the words *ποιούντα ἡδονήν* instead of *ἡδοναί*, because the classification is primarily of objects causing pleasure, as the examples, *τιμή, νίκη* &c., shew, and only through these of the pleasures themselves.

The writer of B₂ does not seem to appreciate the reason for this refinement, and taking instead the perhaps more natural formula, *ἡδοναί καὶ ἐπιθυμιαί*, involves himself in the inaccuracy—helped out as before said (paragraph 30) by the parenthesis—of giving *ἡδέα* and *ἐπιθυμητά, νίκη, τιμή*, &c., as instances of *ἡδοναί* and *ἐπιθυμιαί*; which of course is avoided in B₁.

In C_1 the fact of the greater guilt in true ἀκρασία is clearly expressed in the sentence ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρασία ψέγεται, οὐχ ὡς ἀμαρτία μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς κακία τις; the corresponding phrase in C_2 , ἡ γὰρ ἀκρασία οὐ μόνον φευκτὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν ἐστίν, is much weaker, and gets the author into a confusion, for here he makes ψέγεσθαι the differentia of the ἀκρατῆς ἀπλῶς from the ἀκρατῆς κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, whereas above (B_2 , 1148 a 27–28) the term ψέγεσθαι is used of the error of both.

The substitution of φύσει αἰρετά for αἰρετὰ καθ' αὐτά, betrays perhaps some inexactness of thinking. In B_2 from the class of things pleasant (ἡδέα) called φύσει αἰρετά are excluded not only the objects of unnatural appetite, described in the next chapter—here the ἐναντία τῶν φύσει αἰρετῶν—but also the σωματικά. In chapters v and vi φύσις is applied in a different way to pleasure, so that φύσει ἡδέα (comp. ch. vi, φυσικαὶ ἡδοναί) include the σωματικά, as the context shews. This to say the least tends to confuse, and should have been avoided; for the pleasant object which in ch. v is οὐ φύσει ἡδύ is the same as the pleasant object which is οὐ φύσει αἰρετόν (in the full sense) in ch. iv, while their opposites, φύσει ἡδύ and φύσει αἰρετόν, are not the same.

It may be objected that the author of the second version in ch. iv may not have written the account of the natural and unnatural pleasures, yet this is the less likely because there seem to be three versions of that account, and the words ἐναντία τούτων seem to be suggested by it.

42. The differences then in the subject matter seem to favour the supposition that the two versions are not by the same author. Taken by itself perhaps the argument is not satisfactory, for though like that by which the diverse authorship of the Eudemean and Nicomachean Ethics may be proved, the evidence is by no means so decisive. It receives however important corroboration from the differences in style which have been pointed out in paragraphs 37, 38, and it may not be too much to say that the facts taken altogether point in the direction of diversity rather than of unity in the authorship.

SECTION II.

NIC. ETH. VII. viii. §§ 4, 5. (TABLE VI.)

43. Of the two parallel versions A_2 and A_1 , A_2 seems to be the later.

(a) In A_1 it is said of the ἀκρατῆς that because he has not lost the moral ἀρχή he is βελτίων τοῦ ἀκολάστου; in A_2 , that because he

has not lost this ἀρχή he is εὐμετάπειστος, which the ἀκόλαστος is not. The latter version is an advance, so far as it shews more precisely where the superiority of the ἀκρατής lies—'he is more open to persuasion.'

So also the phrase καθ' ὑπερβολήν is an advance of the same kind on the vaguer ἀνέδην of A₁ (διώκειν ἀνέδην, 1151 a 23).

(β) In A₁ the fact of the preservation of the ἀρχή by the ἀκρατής is shortly stated in the words σώζεται γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον ἢ ἀρχή; the same thing is given A₂, but the author adds an account of its reason, based apparently upon what is said in Nic. Eth. VI. v. 6, about the relation of the ἀρχή to κακία and ἀρετή. This looks like an attempt to improve.

44. There seems to be some evidence that A₂ is by an inferior thinker; at least there are confusions in it from which A₁ is free.

The author of A₂ in trying to explain how the ἀρχή is preserved in the ἀκρατής gets into serious difficulties. The sentence, ἐκείνος (i.e. ὁ ἀκρατής) μὲν οὖν εὐμετάπειστος ὁ δ' οὗ ἢ γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ μοχθηρία τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ μὲν φθείρει ἢ δὲ σώζει implies that the ἀκρατής has ἀρετή. This way of speaking is contrary to Aristotelian usage, to that in Nic. Eth. VI. v. 6, and to that in other parts of bk. VII (comp. e.g. VII. i. 4); in fact, while in this book μοχθηρία is often identified with ἀκολασία, as here, its opposite, ἀρετή, is identified with σωφροσύνη. The writer does not seem sufficiently conscious of the inaccuracy to avoid it by some modification of the term ἀρετή. He rather loses sight of it in a comparison of the ἀρχαί in morals to those of mathematics (see paragraph 46 β), in the circumstance, more especially, that neither kind is given by λόγος; and though this leads him to say that in morals the ἀρχή is due to ἀρετή, either φυσικὴ or ἐθιστή, he makes no use of the latter distinction to qualify the ascription of ἀρετή to the ἀκρατής. It could be objected that this may have been done in a lost continuation of A₁, but the thought does not seem to be going in that direction: see also below, paragraph 46 (γ).

To attribute ὁρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν to φυσικὴ ἀρετή looks like another confusion, for this is quite against the tenor of the doctrine about φυσικὴ ἀρετή, which is given in Eth. VI. xiii. There it is distinctly said that φυσικὴ ἀρετή does not belong to the δοξαστικόν but to the ἡθικόν in the soul (VI. xiii. 2): from this point of view it would be inaccurate to speak of ὁρθοδοξεῖν as the function of φυσικὴ ἀρετή, nor is there anything of the kind to be found in VI. xiii.

The substitution of the more determinate εὐμετάπειστος for βελτίων disturbs the context awkwardly. For μὴ πεπεισθαι, of the ἀκρατής, is retained (compare A₂, 1151 a 11, with A₁ 1151 a 23), and πέπεισται said of the ἀκόλαστος; and whereas πεπεισθαι means a conviction as

to the right moral principle of action, *εὐμετάπειστος* for the *ἀκρατής* does not refer to a change of conviction (as *μεταπεισθεὶς* does in ii. 11), but to a change of will, for his judgment is right—*οἷος μὴ διὰ τὸ πεπεισθαι διώκειν*, κ.τ.λ.

45. The foregoing arguments give some ground for supposing that *A*₂ is the later version and the work of a more confused thinker than the writer of *A*₁. If this is so, with the same reasoning as in paragraphs 40-1 it may be inferred that *A*₁ and *A*₂ are by different authors: a conclusion doubtless open to dispute as far as the evidence goes hitherto given for it, but made somewhat more probable by some of the considerations in the next paragraph.

46. As in ch. iv, so here, what might be thought 'Eudemeanisms' are to be found in one version only, viz. in *A*₂.

(a) The first of these is the use of *ὑποθέσεις*: 1151 a, *ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις*. According to the Posterior Analytics, the term *ὑποθέσεις* is to be applied in demonstrative science not to all *ἀρχαί*, but to a particular species of the class of *ἀρχαί* named *θέσεις*. There are places in the writings ascribed to Aristotle where *ὑπόθεσις* = *ἀρχή* in the general sense of a premiss from which a conclusion may be drawn: but there do not seem to be instances of *ὑποθέσεις* put specially for the ultimate *ἀρχαί* of mathematical science as such. There is an apparent exception in Metaphysics, 1086 a 10, *ἰδίαις γὰρ καὶ οὐ μαθηματικὰς ὑποθέσεις λέγουσι*, but the meaning appears to be simply '(though dealing with mathematical number) they use principles of their own which do not apply to mathematics, instead of mathematical ones,' and *ὑποθέσεις* is really for *ἀρχαί* in the more general sense (compare in the same context, 1086 a 15, *αἴτιον δ' ὅτι αἱ ὑποθέσεις καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ψευδεῖς*), not as the special designation of ultimate principles of mathematic proof; and even if it were, the exception would be accounted for by the fact that the author is speaking of a Platonic theory, and might well take the Platonic term. Still in Metaphysics, bk. IV. ch. i, *ὑπόθεσις* is employed to distinguish the meaning of *ἀρχή* as first principle of knowledge, from its other meanings¹, e.g. cause of motion and change in general; and, as a similar distinction is wanted here, it is not impossible that Aristotle should have written as in the text.

In the Eudemean Ethics *ὑποθέσεις* is the 'regular word for the first principles of demonstration. Compare Eud. Eth. II. xi. 1227 a 8, *περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ τέλους οὐθεὶς βουλευέται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ*

¹ 1013 a 14, *ἐτι ὅθεν γνωστὸν τὸ πρῶτον καὶ αὕτη ἀρχὴ λέγεται τοῦ πράγματος, οἷον τῶν ἀποδείξεων αἱ ὑποθέσεις*.

ὑπόθεσις, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς ἐπιστήμας ὑποθέσεις: Eud. Eth. II. xi. 1227 b 28, ὥσπερ γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις: Eud. Eth. II. vi. 1222 b 23-28 . . . ταῖς ἀκινήτοις ἀρχαῖς οἷον ἐν ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς . . . , τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἀνελεῖν

In Eud. Eth. VII. ii. 1235 b 30, is found (preceded by λαβεῖν ἀρχὴν τήνδε 1235 b 25) λαβεῖν ὑπόθεσιν ἐτέραν, equivalent to the Aristotelian expression, ἄλλην λαβεῖν (ποιήσασθαι) ἀρχήν (also used by Eudemus) which shews a tendency to replace ἀρχή by ὑπόθεσις: there is however something similar in the De Caelo and De Gen. Animal., see Bonitz, Index 797 a 8 seqq. But more than this, the author of Eud. Eth. II. vi. expressly says that the word ἀρχή is only rightly used of ἀρχαὶ κινήσεως, and not of speculative first principles, these last being called ἀρχαί by analogy, καθ' ὁμοιότητα. Compare too the fragment of Eudemus in Simplicius, fol. 3 (Spengel II), where also the Aristotelian use of ἀρχή is criticised, and the term restricted to mean ἀρχὴ κινήσεως ('efficient cause') in distinction from αἰτία (= 'reason' or 'ground').

(β) Secondly, the comparison of the οὐ ἔνεκα, or principles of action in morals, with the first principles of science is a favourite one in the Eudemian Ethics: see the passages partly quoted above (1227 b 28, 1227 a 8, 1222 b 23 seqq.)

(γ) Thirdly, as already noticed, the statement that ἀρετὴ preserves the ἀρχή in the ἀκρατής seems un-Aristotelian in form. In the Eudemian Eth. II. xi, however, there is something akin to this¹. The curious doctrine is maintained that the rightness of the end (τέλος, σκόπος, ἀρχή) is due to ἀρετή; the right direction of λόγος, which calculates the means, to ἐγκράτεια; the perversion of the end to κακία. This would imply also that ἀκρασία only perverts the direction of λόγος, as calculation of means, thus preventing the steps being taken for realising the good ἀρχή, while the good ἀρχή itself is kept in the ἀκρατής by ἀρετή. The writer of this passage in the Eudemian Ethics, or anyone adopting his theory, might easily have written the passage in A₂ (1151 a 15-19): then, too, the sentence. οὔτε δὲ λόγος διδασκαλικὸς τῶν ἀρχῶν οὔτε ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλ' ἀρετή, might be very relevant; if as ἐγκράτεια keeps λόγος right, so ἀκρασία perverts λόγος,

¹ An examination of Eud. Eth. II. ix. seems to show that it was intended for an improvement upon, and reconstruction of, Nic. Eth. VI. xii. 7-10, and that the two passages could not have been meant to stand in the same treatise. This view, if right (for it does not seem to have been taken hitherto) puts considerable difficulties in the way of those who attribute Nic. Eth. VI to Eudemus.

it is important to say that λόγος does not give the ἀρχή, for if it did the ἀρχή would be lost in ἀκρασία.

(δ) Lastly, the conception of φυσικὴ ἀρετή which is found in A_2 is sometimes claimed for 'Eudemus.' It does not occur in the Nicomachean Ethics save in Book VI, which is common to the two treatises, and it does occur in Eud. Eth. III. vii. fin. The argument however attributing it to Eudemus seems unsound, and will be examined hereafter.

Thus the later version A_2 contains several 'Eudemianisms' real or supposed: on the other hand A_1 appears to have nothing of the kind, and reads like what it is customary to call Aristotelian.

47. To the argument against unity of authorship founded on differences of subject matter, it may perhaps be objected, in the present section as in the one before it, that the more advanced version is not necessarily the later. The answer seems to be, in this case as in that one, that the relative advance is such as the same author would probably neither retract (though its form might be improved) nor forget in a subsequent version; and therefore that if the more advanced is earlier, the authors are different. Which is the same conclusion as before.

SECTION III.

NIC. ETH. VII. v. §§ 5-8. (TABLE III.)

48. The differences between the two passages B_3 and B_2 are not great, but such as exist are of the same kind in general as those between the two versions in ch. iv.

(α) B_2 distinguishes (1) the presence of an unnatural impulse which is not merely present, but also overcomes resistance (κρατεῖσθαι μὴ μόνον ἔχειν) from (2) the presence of an unnatural impulse which does not overcome (ἔχειν μόνον, μὴ κρατεῖσθαι δέ). B_3 , with a little more formal accuracy, distinguishes (1) the mere presence of such impulses (τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ἕκαστα τούτων, κ.τ.λ.), (2) their overcoming resistance, (3) their failure to overcome, (τὸ δ' ἔχοντα κρατεῖν ἢ κρατεῖσθαι); and, what is really important, calls attention to the fact that the mere presence of (or liability to) unnatural appetites is an extraordinary depravity. This is somewhat like that part of the advance made by the second version of ch. iv. on the first which is considered above in paragraph 40 init.

(β) The vague phrase ὑπερβάλλουσα in B_3 as compared with the

preciser (οὐ) κατ' ἀνθρώπον and (οὐκ) ἀνθρώπινη, might seem at first by similar reasoning to the above to indicate an advance of B_2 on B_3 : but an examination of the earlier part of this chapter suggests that ὑπερβάλλουσα may possibly have been used as a designed correction of the formula of B_2 . In § 1, ch. v, the natural and unnatural pleasures are not characterised respectively by the terms human and inhuman, for the distinction is not confined to the pleasures of man (see paragraph 17 ε, ii), so that some pleasures not properly human would be 'natural.' On this account perhaps the author of B_3 may have purposely avoided expressing the distinction of ἀκρασία in unnatural pleasures from true ἀκρασία by the terms human and inhuman as is done in B_2 . This again perhaps connects the first part of the chapter, § 1—4 (A_3), more closely with B_3 than B_2 , and accordingly B_2 may originally have followed on a lost duplicate version (A_2) of §§ 1—4.

(γ) B_2 (§ 8, 1149 a 19) only calls the unnatural ἀκρασία, θηριώδης ἢ νοσηματώδης, without anything further; but B_3 adds several lines illustrating what is meant by the application of these epithets in other vices beside ἀκρασία. With this should be compared the elucidatory additions made by the second version in ch. iv. to the first: see paragraph 8 (β).

(δ) B_2 is more neatly expressed throughout than B_3 . There is a little inaccuracy in B_3 in the sentence τὸ δ' ἔχοντα κρατεῖν ἢ κρατεῖσθαι οὐχ ἡ ἀπλῇ ἀκρασία ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ὁμοιότητα, for of course it is only κρατεῖσθαι which can be ἀκρασία and not κρατεῖν. There is a greater difficulty in the opening words τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ἕκαστα τούτων ἕξω τῶν βρων ἐστὶ τῆς κακίας, for they virtually make the liability to unnatural pleasures an excessive or extraordinary kind of κακία, but this is all that could be said of ἀκολασία (μοχθηρία) in the same pleasures: it is difficult to see what word the author could have used, but the point is that he does not attempt a distinction. The above however is not enough to prove that B_3 , which is in some ways an advance (see α, β, γ), is by the less able philosopher.

49. The expression ἡ ἀπλῇ ἀκρασία, in B_3 , looks un-Aristotelian. Aristotle seems not to use the adjective ἀπλούς in the sense of οὐ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, but the adverb ἀπλῶς: ἀπλῇ τραγωδία and the like are clearly not parallels. In the Eudemian Ethics the adjective occurs in a similar manner where the adverb would be Aristotelian: VII. ii. 1238 b 6, ἀλλὰ ἀγαθὰ=τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ, and again 1238 b 7. This seems to be the only phrase in either passage which could be called a 'Eudemianism,' and it is noteworthy that it is found in the

version which seems to be the later, as before. B₂ has ἀπλῶς, 1149 a 18-19.

50. The facts in the two passages taken by themselves are too scanty to justify a conclusion as to their authorship, but their general relation to one another is parallel to that of the other versions treated of, where there is better evidence of the work of different hands.

SECTION IV.

NIC. ETH. VII. vi. §§ 5-7; and VII. v. (TABLE III.)

51. The following relations between the three versions in these chapters suggest that the one in ch. vi (A₁, B₁) is the earlier.

(α) As already stated, the terms 'natural' and 'unnatural' are applied in A₁ only to human pleasures; but in A₃ they are applied to the pleasures of brutes also.

(β) A₃ has a further refinement in the distinction of that which is natural absolutely (ἀπλῶς), from that which is natural relatively to the particular kind of man or animal considered. Of this there is no trace in ch. vi.

(γ) In A₁, ch. vi, the division of 'natural' and 'unnatural or brutish' is made expressly within the class of bodily pleasures, and nothing said of unnatural impulses which are not bodily:—*ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία περὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡδονὰς σωματικὰς δῆλον. αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰς διαφορὰς ληπτέον, κ.τ.λ.*

σωματικά ἡδοναί, without further qualification, and in such connection with *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀκολασία*, would usually mean the particular pleasures of ἀφῆ and γεῦσις mentioned in ch. iv, B₁; and of these the author is probably thinking.

But in A₃, ch. v, the general formula, in which the classification is conveyed, implies no such restriction,—'since some things give natural pleasure' &c., not 'since some bodily pleasures are natural:' so also the terms δι' ἑθῆ, διὰ μοχθηρὰς φύσεις suggest something more than mere bodily pleasures. It is true that in the first part of the chapter the examples are all of what might be called (in a wider sense) *σωματικά*, but this may be unintentional, and such as *τριχῶν τίλσεις*, *δυνάων τρώξεις*, seem to show that the author is not confining the species to the object matter which appears to be signified in A₁. The examples however in the second part, B₃, of brutish vices not founded on bodily impulses of any sort, *θηριώδης δειλία*, *χαλεπότης*, are evidence of a tendency to give *θηριότης* an extended meaning.

This characteristic of B_3 is another reason for supposing that it rather than B_2 belongs to A_3 , for B_2 gives only examples of the two species of *σωματικά* which seem intended by the more limited formula of A_1 , *εἰ Φάλαρις κατεῖχεν ἐπιθυμῶν παιδίου φαγεῖν ἢ πρὸς ἀφροδισίων ἀποπνῆσθαι ἡδονήν*.

(δ) A_3 , ch. v, not only mentions more subdivisions of unnatural pleasure than ch. vi, A_1 —see above, paragraph 17, ε. ii—but also illustrates them by a number of examples: ch. vi, A_1 , gives no examples.

(ε) The treatment also of different kinds of action concerned with unnatural appetites is less developed in B_1 (ch. vi), than in B_2 and B_3 (ch. v).

(i) Both of these latter versions distinguish, as already noticed, susceptibility to such impulses, on the one hand, from their relation to the will on the other: of this there is nothing in B_1 , ch. vi.

(ii) According to B_2 and B_3 ἀκολασία and ἀκρασία have only to do with natural pleasure; B_1 is in agreement—*τούτων δὲ περὶ τὰς πρώτας* (i.e. τὰς φυσικὰς) *σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀκολασία μόνον ἐστίν*, 1149 b 30, but misses out ἀκρασία, which however need not be inserted, because ch. iv. has decided that its objects are the same as those of σωφροσύνη and ἀκολασία.

(iii) There is a more interesting difference of B_1 from the other versions (B_2 and B_3). Unnatural or brutish faults are divided in B_2 and B_3 into two kinds parallel to ἀκρασία proper, and μοχθηρία proper (ἀπλῶς λεγομένη), and distinguished from them by the epithets καθ' ὁμοιότητα, κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, θηριώδης: these refer to human action. B_1 also speaks of something parallel to ἀκολασία and σωφροσύνη, and distinguished by the epithet κατὰ μεταφοράν, in the sphere of brutish pleasures; but of brutish pleasures literally, as the pleasure of brutes, without expressed reference to human action—*διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία οὔτε σώφρονα οὔτε ἀκόλαστα λέγομεν, ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ μεταφοράν*. So θηριότης is described below as if in a literal θηρίον: *οὐ γὰρ διέφθαρται τὸ βέλτιστον, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχει*, 1150 a 2, 3. This is accounted for by the fact noticed, that to this writer 'natural' pleasure is synonymous with 'human,' and 'unnatural' with 'brutish,' and, accordingly, a man liable to unnatural appetites is so far a brute. The theory is notwithstanding generically the same in all three versions, only that B_2 and B_3 do not suppose such an absence of practical reason (*προαίρεσις* and *λογισμός* 1149 b 35) from the subject of unnatural appetites, as is implied by B_1 , and therefore θηριώδης ἀκολασία and ἀκρασία are not such mere metaphors in the former versions as in the latter: this change in B_2 and B_3 seems an improvement.

(ζ) The appetites caused by madness, *διὰ μανίαν*, may have been suggested to the author of *A*₃, ch. v, by *ὥσπερ οἱ μαινόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων* in *B*₁, ch. vi. 6, 1149 b 35: but it must be noticed that the author of this passage is not dealing specially with the pleasures of madmen; he is led to compare the behaviour of animals in a certain condition to their wrong acts, because reason is wanting in both.

Again, the extension in ch. v of the terms 'natural' and 'unnatural' to the pleasures of animals may perhaps have been suggested by ch. vi. 6, *διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία*, κ.τ.λ. 1149 b 31-1150 a 1: but if so it is only suggested, for the same thing is not meant. What is said in ch. vi. is that *ἀκολασία* may be used metaphorically for some abnormal states of animals (*ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως*); but the context shows that these states are only abnormal in animals in the same sense as *ἀκολασία* proper is abnormal in mankind, not in the sense in which 'unnatural' vices are so.

52. Two grounds have been given (see paragraph 48 β fin. and 51 γ fin.) for the conjecture that *B*₃ not *B*₂ belongs to *A*₃: to these may be added that the illustration of Phalaris in *B*₂ has occurred already in *A*₃. They have not however much weight: an illustration might easily be repeated in this particular way in the same context, and as the interest in the second members (*B*₁, *B*₂, *B*₃) of the parallel versions is for human conduct and bodily or sensual pleasures, it is not necessary that they should show any trace of the wider applications of the term unnatural pleasure, which may have been made in a first member.

SECTION V.

NIC. ETH. VII. viii. § 2 and x. § 4. (TABLE V.)

53. In the case of these passages, there seems to be nothing to prove diversity of authorship; but there is an equal absence of evidence for the contrary. Compare the differences mentioned above (paragraph 20 β).

54. The subject of either would follow well upon ch. vii, § 8: see Table V. The second passage would read coherently after it, and agrees with it in the use of the word *μελαγχολικοί*, in reference to the *ἀκρασία* called *προπέτεια*: see above, paragraph 20 β.

The first passage (viii, 2) differs, as already seen, from ch. vii, § 8,

in using ἐκστατικοί instead of μελαγχολικοί¹; and cannot be read after it without some harshness, for αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων would then properly refer to the second of the two kinds of ἀκρασία mentioned in ch. vii. § 8, viz. ὀξείς and μελαγχολικοί, whereas it clearly refers to both kinds. The words αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων however do not suit their present context, as has been shown (paragraph 34), so it is possible ch. viii, § 2, followed immediately after a duplicate of ch. vii, § 8, if not after this passage itself.

On the other hand, ch. x, § 4 may belong to the same version as ch. vii, § 8, and may have followed it immediately, though this is doubtful.

SECTION VI.

NIC. ETH. VII. vii. (TABLE IV.)

55. These two accounts of μαλακία and καρτερία are somewhat divergent.

(α) The sphere of μαλακία is wider in A_2 than A_1 : see above, paragraph 23 fin.

(β) The characters concerned with pleasure being σωφροσύνη, ἐγκράτεια, ἀκρασία, and ἀκολασία, A_1 implies only a twofold division of characters concerned with pain, namely, the μαλακός parallel to the ἀκρατής, and the καρτερικός parallel to the ἐγκρατής. To these last A_2 adds a third character parallel to the ἀκόλαστος, the common point being that in both the action is διὰ προαίρεσιν:—ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ φεύγων τὰς σωματικὰς λύπας μὴ δι' ἡτταν ἀλλὰ διὰ προαίρεσιν.

The state of mind here described differs from μαλακία apparently in this, that the μαλακός does wrong reluctantly (δι' ἡτταν καὶ παρὰ προαίρεσιν), to avoid the pressure of a pain, whereas the other does wrong, in the same circumstances, without any reluctance, because he avoids pain on principle, and from deliberate conviction.

The addition seems due to mere considerations of symmetry; the object being to find a member in the division of characters influenced by pain corresponding to ἀκολασία in the characters influenced by pleasure, differing from μαλακία as ἀκολασία does from ἀκρασία.

This may well be the work of a disciple thinking to improve on the original classification, who nevertheless does not find a name for the new species, but calls it, somewhat confusedly, εἶδος μαλακίας

¹ The two terms are combined in Problems, 953 b 14, 15, τῶν μελαγχολικῶν ὅσοι ἐκστατικοί.

μᾶλλον, i.e. not ἀκολασία, but rather a sort of μαλακία. See below, paragraph 77.

The logical result of this formalism would be to discuss the possibility of adding a fourth character, differing from the καρτερικός as the σώφρων from the ἐγκρατής. Such a distinction would be invalid, and especially unintelligible if κρατεῖν be refused to the καρτερικός: but it is an obvious sign of weakness to complete the symmetry in one direction, and to be silent as to the reason for not completing it in the other.

(γ) Another unsuccessful attempt to refine is the substitution by the second version of ἀντέχειν for κρατεῖν as characteristic of καρτερία: for this, so far from being an improvement, is a fallacy.

In the case of a struggle between two persons, it would be of course true that ἀντέχειν and νικᾶν were different, and that νικᾶν was the better of the two. If now the relation of opposing motives be compared to such a combat, ἀντέχειν could only mean a balance of motives, where the agent is quite undecided, and no action results.

But this is not the meaning of καρτερία, nor is there any ground in the context for believing such a meaning here intended. And, if it were, the division ought to have been carried further, and a corresponding character put on the side of pleasure, differing, as only withstanding pleasure, from the ἐγκρατής who overcomes it. The author seems to have been misled by the word καρτερεῖν, he probably thinks of the καρτερικός as 'enduring' (καρτερῶν), or 'holding out (ἀντέχων) against' pain which cannot be annihilated—compare the examples in §§ 5, 6¹—and in that sense cannot be overcome (κρατεῖν). But since this 'holding out' means that the man does not allow the pain to determine his will, it is κρατεῖν in the fullest sense; the other kind of κρατεῖν which he has not, is of no importance morally, because it is not in the sphere of his will at all. It is quite mistaken, therefore, to rank ἐγκρατής higher than καρτερικός, on the ground that the latter does not 'overcome' in the sense described.

56. Such embarrassments as the above are not to be found in A₁, § 1, and the probable relation of the two versions is, that the longer, A₂, is the later, and that it is the work of an inferior thinker, who, in attempting to make advance on the other, only adds subtleties partly confused and partly fallacious.

57. (a) Neither version seems Aristotelian; if either is by the author of Eud. Eth. II. he must have changed his views.

¹ Compare also Arist. Problems 949 b 32 seqq. (the duplicate of 949 b 26 seqq.), and Eud. Eth. 1221 a 28, both quoted in the next paragraph.

(1) It has been shown that in the chapters upon *ἀνδρεία* and *σωφροσύνη*, in the earlier part of the Nicomachean and Eudemean Ethics, *καρτερία* and *μαλακία* are related to the objects of the former, not to those of the latter. Either association might obviously be made according to circumstances; but the fixed usage of Nic. Eth. VII. vii, does not appear to be recognised elsewhere in the 'Aristotelian' writings, except in the treatise *Περὶ Ἀρετῶν καὶ Κακιῶν*, and the *Magna Moralia*.

In the following passages neither association is suggested:—*Rhet.* 1383 b 35 seqq., *καὶ τὸ μὴ ὑπομένειν πόρους οὓς οἱ πρεσβύτεροι ἢ οἱ τρυφῶντες ἢ οἱ ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ μᾶλλον ὄντες ἢ ὅλως οἱ ἀδυνατώτεροι· πάντα γὰρ μαλακίας σημεῖα*—*Prob.* 949 b 32, *διὰ τί ἦττον καρτεροῦμεν διψῶντες ἢ πεινῶντες*;—*Eud. Eth.* 1221 a 28, *ὁ μηδεμίαν ὑπομένων λύπην μὴδ' εἰ βέλτιον, τρυφερός*.—*Rhet.* 1368 b 17 seqq., *ὁ δ' ἀκόλαστος περὶ τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἡδονάς, ὁ δὲ μαλακὸς περὶ τὰ ῥάθυμα, ὁ δὲ δειλὸς περὶ τοὺς κινδύνους*.

In the following *καρτερία* and *μαλακία* are connected rather with *ἀνδρεία* and *δειλία*:—*Nic. Eth.* 1116 a 12–14, *Eud. Eth.* 1229 a 1–10, both quoted above (paragraph 32): compare also *Pol.* 1278 b 27, *καρτεροῦσι πολλὴν κακοπάθειαν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γλιχόμενοι τοῦ ζῆν*.

In the following rather with *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀκολασία*:—*Pol.* 1269 b 20–23, *πόλιν . . . καρτερικὴν, . . . ἀκολάστως πρὸς ἅπασαν ἀκολασίαν καὶ τρυφερώς*: *Prob.* 880 a 4, 5, *λαγνὸς καὶ μαλακός*: *Pol.* 1270 b 34, *ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι καρτερεῖν ἀλλὰ λάθρα τὸν νόμον ἀποδιδράσκοντας ἀπολαύειν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν*: and less definitely, *Eud. Eth.* 1225 b 30, *καρτερεῖν ἐν πάθεσι*, *Nic. Eth.* X. ix. 1179 b 33, *σωφρόνως καὶ καρτερικῶς ζῆν*, *Pol. II. ix.* 1270 b 3.

The treatise *Περὶ Ἀρετῶν καὶ Κακιῶν*, on the other hand, connects *καρτερία* and *μαλακία* definitely with both sides, which is consistent with its apparent character of a late Peripatetic compendium. 1251 a 14, *ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ τῇ δειλίᾳ μαλακία, ἀνανδρία, κ.τ.λ.*: 1251 a 28, *ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ τῇ ἀκρασίᾳ μαλακία*: 1250 b 4 seqq., *παρέπεται δὲ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ . . . καὶ ἡ καρτερία*: 1250 b 12–14, *ἐγκρατείας δ' ἐστὶ . . . καὶ τὸ καρτερεῖν, κ.τ.λ.*

(2) Neither the author of the Nicomachean nor the author of the Eudemean accounts of *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀκολασία* connect them with any other pains than what are caused by the desire for pleasure: see paragraph 39 β.

(3) Even if it be objected that in the first version, *A₁*, *λύπας . . . καὶ φυγὰς* might only refer to such pains, the answer seems to be that in

Nic. Eth. III. x-xi, there is no thought of separating the desire for pleasure and the pain of such desire as different motives, and constitutive of different characters, but they are clearly aspects of one and the same thing. Compare III. xi. 5, quoted in paragraph 39 β.

(4) If either version is Aristotelian, it is later than Nic. Eth. III. which does not allude to ἐγκράτεια or ἀκρασία¹, (compare also paragr. 39 α, fin.), and therefore Aristotle must have changed his view on the last two points (see 2 and 3); but this is very unlikely, for what would then be the earlier stage shows much greater insight into the psychology of Ethics. Eudemus might however have abandoned the doctrine which he did not originate and may never have appreciated; certainly he does not dwell on it in the same way as Aristotle, and in excluding the pleasures of sight, sound, and smell, he excludes also the corresponding pains caused by τὰ αἰσχροτάτα, τὰ ἀνάρμοστα, and τὰ δυσώδη, which is superfluous, for they are not pains of desire, Eud. Eth. III. ii. 6.

(β) A' (VII. x. 4, see Table IV), though very like A₁, omits all mention of καρτερία and μαλακία. The passage is in itself too short to prove anything, and it is not unlikely that its immediate context has been lost, but from the foregoing (α, 1-4) it may be conjectured that the omission is caused by the absence from the first version of the book of any such direct treatment of καρτερία and μαλακία as that in ch. vii.

There are other appearances which confirm this impression.

(1) Ch. iv, D₁, includes in ἀκρασία proper that yielding to pain which here constitutes μαλακία in distinction from ἀκρασία: while the word μαλακοί is incidentally used in a way which seems quite to ignore ch. vii: see paragraphs 83, 85.

(2) The subject is promised in ch. i, § 4, 1145 a 33-b 2: but the relation of that section to its context is suspicious. It distinguishes four bad or immoral states, κακία, θηριότης, ἀκρασία, and μαλακία, of which the last three are to be treated of together with the good states ἐγκράτεια and καρτερία: but the opening words of the book, ch. i, § 1, in what seems meant for an exhaustive division, distinguish only three vicious states, with no word either of μαλακία or καρτερία:— τῶν περὶ τὰ ἥθη φευκτῶν τρία ἐστὶν εἶδη, κακία, ἀκρασία, θηριότης. τὰ δ' ἐναντία τοῖς μὲν δυσὶ δὴλα: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν τὸ δ' ἐγκράτειαν καλοῦμεν, κ.τ.λ. Another difficulty in the same section (§ 4) is that it seems to assign a place to the discussion of θηριότης, not compatible with the present order of the subjects.

(3) In one of the duplicate beginnings to ch. iii, A, καρτερία is

¹ Contrast in the corresponding Eudemian passage 1231 a 25, and 1231 b 3-4.

set down for discussion, in the other, A', nothing is said of it, and there is an independent ground for thinking that A' is earlier than A: see paragraph 61.

58. Fritzsche remarks on 1150 b 4, that the use of *ἀπό* after *λύπη* is not found elsewhere in the Nicomachean Ethics, and is repeated twice in the Eudemian, 1222 b 11, 1232 a 17, so with *δδύνη* in 1230 a 3. If it be a 'Eudemianism' it occurs, like the others, in the apparently later and less able version: but under the uses of *ἀπό* in Eucken (Sprachgebr. d. Arist. p. 8), are given two references from the Nic. Ethics for *ἡδονῇ ἀπό τινος*, 1173 b 29, and 1174 a 10 (X. iii. 10, iii. 13), and one from the Poetics, 1453 a 36.

SECTION VII.

NIC. ETH. VII. iii. (TABLE I.)

59. Of the two versions, that in the second column seems to be the latest, on account of the additions which have been examined above, paragraph 28.

B₁ and B₂ might be interchanged, and it cannot be affirmed certainly that B₂ belongs to the second version: it is however a little longer than B₁, and adds an illustration—*δηλοῖ δὲ Ἡράκλειτος*; this is in keeping with the addition of illustrations in C₂, and may give some slight ground therefore for assigning B₂ to the second version.

With *ἐν ταῖς ποιητικαῖς* in D₂, 1147 a 28, compare Eud. Eth. I. v. 1216 b 11–19, where *ποιητικαὶ ἐπιστήμαι* includes *πρακτικά*: *τοῦτο δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν συμβαίνει τῶν θεωρητικῶν . . . τῶν δὲ ποιητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἕτερον τὸ τέλος τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ γνώσεως, οἷον ὑγίεια μὲν ἱατρικῆς εὐνομία δὲ ἣ τι τοιοῦθ' ἕτερον τῆς πολιτικῆς*. Eud. Eth. II. xi. 1227 b 28 seqq. (part quoted in paragraph 46. α), is less definite, but *ταῖς ποιητικαῖς* has probably there also the same wider meaning.

60. Whether the two versions B₁ C₁ D₁, B₂ C₂ D₂, are by the same hand or not, there is a strong probability that (α) neither is by Aristotle, that (β) neither is by the author of the Eudemian Ethics—or at least of the second book of that treatise, and that (γ) they are not by the same author as some of the most important parts of this book.

(α) Against Aristotelian origin:—

(i) The theory appears quite unworthy of Aristotle. The question at

issue is,—‘How is it that a man knowing the right can do the wrong?’ (compare VII. ii. 1, ἀπορήσειε δ’ ἂν τις πῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς ἀκρατεύεται τις), or, ‘How is the struggle possible between ἐπιθυμία and λόγος of which the ἀκρατής is conscious, ending in the victory of ἐπιθυμία?’

Clearly the answer given in the chapter is worse than no answer: if in the ἀκρατής knowledge of right and wrong is not realised but dormant (μὴ θεωροῦντα ἃ μὴ δεῖ πράττειν, 1146 b 33); if, though he knows the general principle (the major premiss) which would condemn his action, he has not realised the particular circumstances (the minor premiss) in his act which make the principle applicable to it;—then he does not know that what he is doing is wrong, and therefore is not ἀκρατής at all. A mental struggle is impossible, since there is no actual knowledge for appetite to struggle with. Aristotle could scarcely have acquiesced in a mistake like this.

(ii) There is no trace of this doctrine in the other books of the Nic. Ethics; on the contrary, ἀκρασία is spoken of as though there were an active struggle between reason (λόγος, sometimes προαίρεσις = ‘rational will’) and appetite (ἐπιθυμία), between the desire to do what is wrong and the conviction that it is wrong. Compare the following. Nic. Eth. I. xiii. 15, 16, 1102 b 14–25:—

Τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς τὸν λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν· ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ· φαίνεται δ’ ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός, ὃ μάχεται τε καὶ ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ καθάπερ τὰ παραλελυμένα τοῦ σώματος μόρια εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ προαιρουμένων κινῆσαι τοῦναντίον εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ παραφέρεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως· ἐπὶ τὰναντία γὰρ αἱ ὁρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν. ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὀρώμεν τὸ παραφερόμενον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ὀρώμεν· ἴσως δ’ οὐδὲν ἡττον καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νομιστέον εἶναι τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐναντιούμενον τούτῳ καὶ ἀντιβαῖνον.

Nic. Eth. IX. iv. 8, 1166 b 7–10, διαφέρονται γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ ἐτέρων μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄλλα δὲ βούλονται, οἷον οἱ ἀκρατεῖς· αἰροῦνται γὰρ ἀντὶ τῶν δοκούντων ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθῶν εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα βλαβερὰ ὄντα. The following passage also is to the purpose, as there is no hint in the context that the knowledge is useless because merely potential:—Nic. Eth. I. iii. 7, 1095 a 8, τοῖς γὰρ τοιούτοις ἀνόνητος ἢ γνῶσις γίνεται, καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσιν.

(iii) The opinion of Socrates, that virtue is knowledge, because men must act for what is their truest good if they only know it (Xenoph. Mem. III. ix. 4), appears to have been strongly opposed by Aristotle. But ch. iii. is an obvious concession of the Socratic principle, as the writer of the last section of it felt.

(iv) In Aristotle the distinction of potential and actual knowledge is made not unfrequently—compare e.g. Metaph. 1017 b 3, τὸ δυνάμενον χρῆσθαι τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὸ χρώμενον: 1048 a 34, ἐπιστήμονα καὶ τὸν μὴ θεωροῦντα ἂν δυνατός ᾖ θεωρεῖν—but it seems never applied to explain ἀκρασία.

There is an important passage for ἀκρασία in De Anima III. ix-x. 432 a 1-b 10, with no hint of the want of a minor premiss, nor of the theory that the ἀκρατής only knows potentially, not actually, that what he does is evil: the language indeed implies the opposite and stands in marked contrast to both versions of this chapter. Compare De An. III. ix. 8, 433 a 1-3:—

Ἔτι καὶ ἐπιτάττοντος

τοῦ νοῦ καὶ λεγούσης τῆς διανοίας φεύγειν τι ἢ διώκειν οὐ κινεῖται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πράττει, οἷον ὁ ἀκρατής

and De An. III x. 6, 433 b 5-10:—

Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁρέξεις γίνονται ἐναντίαι ἀλλήλαις τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει ὅταν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντίαι ᾖσι, γίνεται δ' ἐν τοῖς χρόνου αἰσθησιν ἔχουσιν (ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς διὰ τὸ μέλλον ἀποθάλπει κελεύει, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία διὰ τὸ ἥδη φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ ἥδη ἡδὺ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀπλῶς, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν τὸ μέλλον).

The last part of this passage, it is true, implies some blindness to real interest on the appetitive side; but the first part clearly recognises, like the former passage, an explicit, not implicit, opposition of the Reason, that its voice is heard forbidding the action, and that there is a struggle, which could not be if the minor premiss were either absent or only potential. This representation, which is a natural and not uncommon one, involves a latent contradiction, concealed however, both in early and in popular psychology, by an unconscious personification of Reason and Appetite. Some feeling of the contradiction might lead a philosopher of less acuteness than Aristotle to the theory of potential knowledge, but Aristotle could scarcely have allowed an answer so inconsistent with the insight into the mental struggle shown by Nic. Eth. I. xiii. 15-16: and there is independent evidence that he did not allow it in its absence

from a context in the Eudemean Ethics, where it would almost certainly have been alluded to if the writer had known of it: see below (β i. ii.)

If, notwithstanding this evidence, it be objected that some such theory as this would be the logical consequence of what is said of pleasure in the chapter on *βούλησις* (Nic. Eth. III. iv. 5), τοῖς πολλοῖς δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἔοικε γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οὕσα ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται, (comp. Eud. Eth. II. x. 26); it by no means follows that Aristotle would be consistent at the expense of obvious facts (τὰ φαινόμενα ἐναργῶς, VII. ii. 2), nor indeed was he, for it would have been equally logical to accept the whole Socratic position, but he did not accept it.

Whatever may be the meaning of the obscure words in De An. III. xi. 434 a 12-14,

Διὸ τὸ βουλευτικὸν οὐκ ἔχει ἡ ὄρεξις. νικᾷ δ' ἐνίοτε καὶ
κινεῖ τὴν βούλησιν· ὅτε δ' ἐκείνη ταύτην, ὥσπερ σφαῖρα, ἡ
ὄρεξις τὴν ὄρεξιν, ὅταν ἀκρασία γένηται·

they speak of actual not potential opposition.

The syllogism in the same context is not used to explain ἀκρασία, and nothing is said of the absence or abeyance of a premiss.

These facts in the De Anima are the more significant, because in that book itself, II. v. 417 a 23, different potentialities of knowledge, and their relation to the actuality, are described with some care: see especially 417 a 26-29, ὁ μὲν ὅτι τὸ γένος, κ.τ.λ. The distinction has been in part given before in De An. II. i, and is used again in Bk. III. iv. 8, 429 b 6.

The practical syllogism occurs in De Motu Animal. ch. vii. with some resemblance of language to §§ 9, 10 (Nic. Eth. VII. iii.), but this proves nothing, unless it be that the writer of this chapter in the Ethics used Aristotelian material in constructing an un-Aristotelian theory.

(β) Disagreement with the Eudemean Ethics.—

There is in the Eudemean Ethics a passage which at first sight might seem evidence for ascribing the chapter to the same author: Eud. Eth. II. ix. 1225 b 11-16:—

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι διττόν, ἐν μὲν τὸ ἔχειν,
ἐν δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, ὁ ἔχων μὴ χρώμενος δὲ ἔστι
μὲν ὡς δικαίως ἀγνοῶν λέγοιτο, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐ δικαίως, οἷον
εἰ δι' ἀμέλειαν μὴ ἐχρήτο. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μὴ ἔχων τις
ψέγοιτο ἂν, εἰ δ' ῥᾶδιον ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν, μὴ ἔχει δι' ἀμέ-
λειαν ἢ ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην.

These words occur in the chapter on the voluntary (*τὸ ἐκούσιον*), which corresponds to the first part of Nic. Eth. bk. III: beside the different kinds of ignorance which in the Aristotelian account affect the responsibility (*ἀγνοῶν*, δι' *ἀγνοίαν*), there is added another, the abeyance of knowledge only potentially existent.

As already seen, the conception is Aristotelian; but Aristotle, in his extant writings at least, did not discuss its relation to the voluntariness of an action.

Though this is done by the author of Eud. Eth. II, and though he speaks of pleasure and pain as among the causes which prevent knowledge from being realised, yet there is proof in the context that he did not so explain *ἀκρασία*.

(i) Just before the passage quoted, *ἀκρασία* is examined at some length, Eud. Eth. II. vii. But it is never said that the *ἀκρατής* has not the right minor, or that his knowledge is in any way potential: the contrary is plainly implied; he is always spoken of as having a conscious wish (*βούλησις*) of some kind, not to do that which he eventually does. Indeed, what puzzles the writer in his aporematic argument is the conscious presence, in the minds of both *ἀκρατής* and *ἐγκρατής*, of two opposite impulses (*ἐναντία ὁρμαί*), one to obey reason, the other to follow appetite.

Compare Eud. Eth. 1224 a 30-6:—

Δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ βλῖαιον ἅπαν λυπηρὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐθεὶς βλῖα μὲν ποιεῖ, χαίρων δέ. διὸ περὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ πλεῖστη ἀμφισβήτησις ἔστιν· ἐναντίας γὰρ ὁρμὰς ἔχων αὐτὸς ἑκαστος αὐτῷ πράττει, ὥσθ' ὃ τ' ἐγκρατὴς βλῖα, φασίν, ἀφέλκει αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἡδέων ἐπιθυμῶν (ἀλγεῖ γὰρ ἀφέλκων πρὸς ἀντιτείνουσιν τὴν ὀρεξιν), ὃ τ' ἀκρατὴς βλῖα παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν

and 1224 b 19-23:—

Καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς χαίρει μὲν τυγχάνων ἀκρατεύμενος οὐ ἐπιθυμεῖ, λυπείται δὲ τὴν ἀπ' ἐλπίδος λύπην· οἶεται γὰρ κακὸν πράττειν.

Here it is rightly observed that there is a consciousness of internal division in the *ἀκρατής*, and a pain of reluctance, both quite impossible in the representation of his action given in Nic. Eth. VII. iii.

Compare also 1223 b 7-9:—

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ ἀκρατεύμενος οὐχ ἂ βούλεται ποιεῖν· τὸ γὰρ παρ' ὃ οἶεται βέλτιστον εἶναι πράττειν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἀκρατεῦσθαι ἔστιν.

and 1223 b 32-3:—

Βούλεται μὲν γὰρ οὐθεὶς ἃ οἶεται
εἶναι κακά, πράττει δ' ὅταν γίνηται ἀκρατής.

Here the language implies, since nothing is said anywhere to the contrary, that the ἀκρατής knows that he is doing wrong.

(ii) How far such a theory as that of Nic. Eth. VII. iii. is from the mind of the author is seen also from the following. These chapters of the Eudemean Ethics (vii. and viii. of bk. II) investigate the will of the ἀκρατής in a manner much in advance of anything Aristotelian. The writer sees that the ordinary account (which is Aristotle's and Plato's) is beset with great difficulties as to freedom and responsibility. These difficulties are stated very clearly, and without any effort to underrate them. Since the ἀκρατής, it is said, acts reluctantly and against his βούλησις, his action seems involuntary (ἀκούσιον); on the other hand, as he is judged ἄδικος, which implies that he is responsible, and as he acts κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν, it seems voluntary (ἐκούσιον).

The author takes great pains to solve this ἀπορία, but contents himself at last with a mere practical answer, quite inadequate to the question, that the action is voluntary because done after all from an impulse (ὁρμή) in the actor. Now if he had held that in ἀκρασία there was not actual, but only implicit knowledge of the wrong, he must have taken that into account in estimating its voluntariness, especially as he adopts the Aristotelian doctrine of the necessity of knowledge to responsibility. One solution he could not have failed to notice, even if he did not accept it:—if reason does not consciously oppose appetite there would be no struggle (ἐναντία ὁρμαί), nor pain of reluctance at the act, and the consequent difficulties as to freedom would vanish: the only kind of involuntariness to be considered would be included under the formulæ ἀγνοῶν and δι' ἀγνοίαν (for which see Eud. Eth. II. ix).

(iii) In no other part of the Eudemean Ethics does there seem to be any trace of the opinion put forward in this chapter (ch. iii. Nic. Eth. VII.=Eud. Eth. VI), nor is it likely that it was an after-thought by the same author. The ethical stand-point of the Eudemean Ethics is essentially opposed to that of Socrates, as is proved not only by the doctrine of ἀκρασία, just cited, so prominent in Eud. Eth. bk. II, but also by two passages, one in a later book, Eud. Eth. VIII. 1246 a 35-b 35, and one in an earlier, Eud. Eth. IV. 1216 b 1-25, which attack and refute the Socratic dictum that knowledge alone is the sufficient condition of virtue.

In both the *De Anima*, then, and the *Eudemean Ethics*, excluding of course this book, the distinction of potential and actual knowledge is made; in both there is some discussion of ἀκρασία; in neither are the two subjects connected at all with one another.

(γ) Disagreement with the main context of bk. VII;—

(i) Ch. ii, §§ 1–4, 1145 b 21–1146 a 4.

According to this passage:—

(1) The Socratic hypothesis conflicts with facts and amounts to a denial of ἀκρασία altogether.

(2) If appetite is resisted by a weak, uncertain opinion as to right and wrong, and not by a strong conviction, there is not properly ἀκρασία.

From (2) it follows a fortiori that there is no ἀκρασία when conviction is only potential, for then there is nothing which can resist at all.

It is not to the purpose to object that this is an aporematic passage, for it is never refuted, and it seems incredible that so much insight could result in the conclusions of ch. iii.

A corroboration of diversity of authorship is that ch. iii, §§ 3, 4 (B₁, B₂), considers independently the position refuted in § 4 of ch. ii, 1145 b 31–1146 a 4, that the ἀκρατής has only δόξα, and not ἐπιστήμη. No reference is made to the former place: quite a different refutation is given, and, significantly enough, one that does not compromise the theory of potential knowledge in the same way.

(ii) Ch. vii, § 8, 1150 b 19–28.

Of the two kinds of ἀκρασία here spoken of, one, προπέτεια, can be easily adjusted to ch. iii; but the other, which is clearly the more important and truer ἀκρασία, cannot possibly, because in this case the man has deliberated about the right course, but does not abide by the result of his deliberation from infirmity of will; he has therefore the fullest knowledge that he is doing wrong.

(iii) The language of the book in general which describes the ἐγκρατής and ἀκρατής seems, naturally at least, to imply that reason is in actual not merely potential opposition to appetite, e.g. ch. ii, § 11, 1146 b 1, 2, εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ἐπέπειστο ἂ πράττει, μεταπεισθεὶς δὲ ἐπαύσατο· νῦν δὲ πεπεισμένος οὐδὲν ἤττον ἄλλα πράττει. In ch. viii, § 5, 1151 a 20 seqq. the ἀκρατής is διὰ πάθος ἐκστατικός παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον: the ἐγκρατής (who must have actual knowledge) is ἐμμεντικός καὶ οὐκ ἐκστατικός. Compare also the phrases οὐκ ἐμμεντικός (ἐμμενῶν) λογισμῷ (δόξῃ, προαιρέσει, ταῖς δόξαισι) ἐκστατικός λογισμοῦ, ἐξίστασθαι τῆς δόξης, applied to the ἀκρατής, and in ch. viii, § 1, 1150 b 36, ἡ μὲν γὰρ κακία λανθάνει, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία οὐ λανθάνει.

(iv) The result of ch. iii. is never alluded to again in the treatise save in a short doubtful passage near the end, which does not seem to belong to its context, ch. x, § 3 : see paragraph 36.

61. (a) According to A the first subject for consideration is that which follows in $B_1 C_1 D_1$, and $B_2 C_2 D_2$, *πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὐ, καὶ πῶς εἰδότες* : A' not only puts a different subject first, but omits this, at least in any direct shape, from the list. Perhaps, therefore, A' belongs to an earlier version, which contained nothing about potential knowledge, and no such separate and lengthy investigation of the kind of knowledge possessed by the *ἀκρατής*.

The writer of A' may merely, as against Socrates, have maintained or presupposed what is implied by ch. ii, that in *ἀκρασία* there is a strong and active consciousness of wrong-doing (*ισχυρὰ ὑπόληψις . . . ἀντιτείνουσα*), and have added that this conviction could be disobeyed if not accompanied, as in *φρόνησις* (comp. ch. ii, § 5, 1146 a 4 seqq.), by a desire to realise it, but opposed by *ἐπιθυμία*. He may have felt no more difficulty in this representation than the author of the passages quoted from the *De Anima* and *Nic. Ethics* seems to have done¹, and therefore not have dwelt on it further, which would account for his not putting the completeness or incompleteness of knowledge in the list A' as a matter to be treated specially. On the other hand, the author or authors of the rest of the chapter perhaps appreciated better (see paragraph 60, a iii.) the real basis of the Socratic paradox, and thus expanded the subject into a main division of the book, giving it recognition in the list A, and its other duplicate, if one existed.

The above is somewhat countenanced by the conclusion of A'. The first problem (*ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως*) being, whether the *ἀκρατής* and *ἐγκρατής* are differentiated by their objects, or by their relation to them ; the fact that the *ἀκρατής* knows he should not adopt the pleasant motive (*ὁ δ' οὐκ οἶεται μὲν διώκει δέ*) is assumed as subsidiary to the solution of the problem, without any hint that the fact itself is a principal difficulty awaiting settlement.

The omission in A', under such circumstances, seems to be too weighty to be counterbalanced by the words in ch. ii. *καὶ δεόν ζητεῖν περὶ τὸ πάθος εἰ δι' ἀγνοίαν τίς ὁ τρόπος γίνεται τῆς ἀγνοίας* : for, even if they are supposed to point to either version of ch. iii. § 3 seqq., they may have been inserted when that version was added to the scheme of the treatise, for they can be removed without injury to the context :—

¹ The author also of *Eud. Eth. II.* raises no doubt as to the completeness of knowledge in *ἀκρασία*.

Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὥς οὐκ οὔσης ἀκрасίας· οὐθένα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος ἀμφισβητεῖ τοῖς φαινομένοις ἐναργῶς, [καὶ δέον ζητεῖν περὶ τὸ πάθος, εἰ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τίς ὁ τρόπος γίνεται τῆς ἀγνοίας] ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ οἶεται γε ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος πρὶν ἐν τῷ πάθει γενέσθαι φανερόν.

(β) If A' really belongs to an earlier version, the omission of the subject of *καρτερία* from it, which is contained in the duplicate A, is in agreement with what has been said of *καρτερία* and *μαλακία* in paragraph 57.

A' may be incomplete and thus the last argument (β) loses some force; but perhaps not the first (α), for if the question whether the *ἀκρατής* has real knowledge had been proposed at all, it would probably have not been postponed to the present contents of A'.

It may be added that *νομίζων δεῖ δεῖν τὸ παρὸν ἡδὺν διώκειν* in A' (1146 b 22) is the only thing in the book like *De An.* 433 b 7, *ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς διὰ τὸ μέλλον ἀνθέλκειν κελεύει, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία διὰ τὸ ἥδη*: though it is unsafe to build on the coincidence.



PART V.

ON THE AUTHORSHIP OF OTHER PASSAGES, WITH SOME CONJECTURES FOR FURTHER RESOLUTION OF THE TEXT.

SECTION I.

NIC. ETH. VII. i. § 6 ; ii. § 5 (=A₁) ; x. §§ 1-2 (=A₂).
(TABLE VII.)

62. The first part of A₂ is parallel to A₁.

Both assert that the same person cannot both be *φρόνιμος* and *ἀκρατής* ; compare 1146 a 5, 6 with 1152 a 6, 7 : both give the same reason,—that the *φρόνιμος* acts on the knowledge of the good (compare 1146 a 8 with 1152 a 8-9), and that he has a good moral character (compare 1146 a 9 with 1252 a 8), and in both there is the same reference presumably to Nic. Eth. VI (compare 1146 a 8, *δέδεικται πρότερον* with 1152 a 8, *δέδεικται*).

Against attributing them to different versions it may perhaps be urged that, as A₁ occurs in the aporematic chapter (ii.), it is the preliminary discussion of difficulties (*ἀπορίαι*) on the *δόξα* stated in the list of ch. i. § 6, *ὅτε δὲ ἐν τοῖς φρονίμοις ὄντας καὶ δεινοὺς ἀκρατεῖς* : just as the *δόξα*, *ὁ μὲν ἀκρατής εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα*, has its *ἀπορία* in ch. ii, § 1 seqq. and its *λύσις* in ch. iii ; and so for other *δόξαι*.

63. But these last cases are not relevant ; A₁ is not a mere statement of difficulties, and does not leave the question open, but settles it definitely and finally :—*ἀλλ' ἀτοπον ἔσται γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς ἅμα φρόνιμος καὶ ἀκρατής, φήσκει δ' ἂν οὐδείς, κ.τ.λ.*

A₂, on the other hand, takes up seriously what A₁ dismisses as scarcely worth consideration, and gives, as already seen, circumstantially the same refutation as A₁.

If only these two passages were to be dealt with, this might perhaps be attributed to forgetfulness, though the short and determinate nature of the subject makes this less likely ; but beside the

evidence of compilation throughout the book, there are some other facts against their being originally intended for the same version.

(a) A_2 corresponds closely to the opinion in ch. i, § 6, *ὅτε . . . φρονίμους ὄντας καὶ δεινούς, κ.τ.λ.* for it treats of the relation of *δεινότης* as well as *φρόνησις* to *ἀκρασία*.

In A_1 there is nothing about *δεινότης*; but this perhaps by itself is not important. What is important, there is no consciousness in A_1 that such an opinion has been proposed for discussion: (1) the passage itself is a part of the *ἀπορίαι* to another opinion, *καὶ ὁ μὲν εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα, κ.τ.λ.*,—the difficulties as to the presence of knowledge in *ἀκρασία*, which take up § 1–5 of ch. ii; and (2) in examining these it is said (A_1) that this knowledge cannot be *φρόνησις*, because that would involve an *absurd* result, viz. that the same man could be *φρόνιμος* and *ἀκρατής*, for *no one would ever maintain* that the *φρόνιμος* could, like the *ἀκρατής*, do wrong willingly: see 1146 a 6, 7. It seems incredible that a proposition thus spoken of should have preceded in the same context as an opinion actually maintained, and therefore to be discussed.

This opinion has really no *ἀπορία* corresponding in ch. ii., as was evidently thought by the Paraphrast, for he writes a special section for it, ch. v, having already paraphrased A_1 under the *ἀπορίαι* about knowledge in the *ἀκρατής*¹. There is no reason to suppose he had a different text, for he only uses the material of A_1 to construct the supplement.

(β) There is another important *δόξα* in ch. i, § 6, the identification of *ἀκρασία* and *ἀκολασία*, which has no *ἀπορία* to answer in ch. ii. but is discussed also at the end of the book just before A_2 , 1152 a 4–6.

From the facts taken together it may be conjectured,—

(i) That the list in ch. i, § 6, did not originally contain the two opinions spoken of, which are not discussed in ch. ii.

(ii) That the presence of A_1 in the aporetic chapter occasioned in a later and less able version the addition to ch. i. § 6 of the opinion related to it; and to the non-aporetic part of the book of a refutation, A_2 , embodying A_1 ; on the analogy of the *δόξαι*, *ἀπορίαι*, and *λύσεις*.

(iii) That the passage preceding A_1 , 1152 a 4–6, may not have been in the original version: this is more doubtful, for it might possibly have appeared at first without either *δόξα* or *ἀπορία* to correspond.

¹ This is misunderstood by the editor of the English reprint of Heinsius, who writes: 'Hoc caput redundat; repetit enim paulo aliter quae cap. 3. dicta sunt.'

64. The order too of the list may have been changed, though this is by no means certain. It does not correspond to the *ἀπορίαι*: which the Paraphrast probably observed, for he gives the *ἀπορίαι* in the order of the *δόξαι*¹.

The latter seem designedly arranged on a logical principle. The first three opinions are on the characteristics of the *ἐγκρατής* and *ἀκρατής*, from more general to more special in order: the next three relate to the confusion of these characters with others, beginning with the more plausible (*σώφρων*=*ἐγκρατής*) and ending with the least plausible (the *φρόνιμος* may be *ἀκρατής*): the last is on other uses of the term *ἀκρασία* beside the normal one.

The list may have been added to and rearranged so as to form a logical classification of the contents of the book, at or after the time when the version was written, containing *A*₂ (1152 a 6-14), and the passage which precedes it, 1152 a 4-6.

The obvious reason for not retaining a duplicate of it, supposing one existed, would be that the one list might be contained word for word in the other: or, if not quite word for word, the absurdity of twice stating the same item of such a list might seem too great even to the compiler.

It is true that in *Metaphys.* bk. II,—which resembles this part of *Nic. Eth.* VII, though it is on a much larger scale—some of the *ἀπορίαι* stated for discussion (*διαπορεῖν*) are omitted in the discussion, and the order not preserved.

But (1) the first is taken first (*πρώτον μὲν οὖν περὶ ὧν πρώτον εἵπομεν*), and the order of the main divisions is generally adhered to. (2) Some of the questions seem treated together, *vid.* Bonitz *ad loc.* (This might be thought true of the opinion as to the compatibility of *φρόνησις* and *ἀκρασία*, but it can hardly be so for the reasons given above, 63 a.) (3) The statement of the difficulties and the discussion of them are both long and intricate, here they are both concise. (4) There is both internal and external evidence that the *Metaphysics* are imperfect.

It is readily admitted that difference of order, and even omissions, may not be of weight in some cases; but here, the shortness of the passages, the importance of one opinion omitted, and the circumstances attending the omission of the other (paragraphs 62-3), especially that the aporetic chapter seems to presuppose that it is not in the list, make them worthy of consideration.

¹ Here again the editor has mistaken the reason. 'Sectiones, quae sequuntur, quinque, sive Andronici ipsius sive librariorum errore, praepostero ordine videntur descriptae.'

SECTION II.

NIC. ETH. VII. i. § 5; ii. § 12. (TABLE VIII.)

65. Between the beginning of this book (Nic. Eth. VII.=Eud. Eth. VI.) and that of the next book in the Eudemian Ethics (VII, which corresponds to Nic. Eth. VIII.) there are such relations as to make it probable that the two passages do not belong to books of the same treatise.

The eighth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, as well as the Eudemian equivalent, opens, like the seventh book, with a general introduction of its subject, Friendship, ch. i. §§ 1-5, followed by some ἀπορίαι, ch. i. § 6; compare διαμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐκ ὀλίγα, 1155 a 32, and 1155 b 8, ἀπορημάτων: so in the Eudemian version, ἀπορεῖται δὲ πολλὰ περὶ τῆς φιλίας, 1235 a 4; but there is nothing to correspond to the remarks in Nic. Eth. VII. i. 5, and ii. 12, on the value of opening a discussion in this way.

The Eudemian version of Nic. Eth. VIII. does introduce such a passage, thereby assimilating the first part of the subject still more to the first part of Nic. Eth. VII. It will be seen that this addition (Eud. Eth. VII. ii. 1, 1235 b 13-18, =X₂) is very like the corresponding places in Nic. Eth. VII. i. 5, ii. 12, (1145 b 2-7 and 1146 b 6-8, =X₁), though the phraseology is different; compare the passages marked a.....^a, b.....^b, c.....^c, in both columns of Table IX.

(a) It is on the whole improbable that an author at the beginning of two books, consecutive or not, of the same treatise should give the same justification at such length of the aporetic method in general, and that too in the second instance, as though he had not done it before. In beginning a new book the way in which a former book of the same treatise was begun is not likely to be forgotten, especially when the beginning is of this kind. Still this is possible if a considerable time has intervened between the composition of the two; and want of opportunity for revision may have prevented alteration.

(β) But there is stronger evidence of a different hand in the second passage; and that there was no forgetfulness. The sentence c.....^c, συμβάλει δὲ μένειν, κ.τ.λ. 1235 b 17-18 in X₂, appears almost certainly to have been written as an elucidation of c.....^c in X₁, τὰ δὲ καταλείπειν, 1146 b 7, which seems to have been understood by the author of X₂ as meaning that some of the ἀπορίαι must be done away with,

crucial
distinction
don't see!

and some left. The latter expression (*καταλείπειν*) seemed paradoxical in connection with the sentence which follows, *ἡ γὰρ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὖρεσις ἐστίν*, because an *aporia* consists of opposing opinions, whose opposition must be somehow overcome: the author of *X*₂ accordingly wrote the passage '.....' to explain it—the opposition (*ἐναντιώσεις*) must be allowed to stand (*μένειν*), if what is said is true in one sense and not in another.' He seems to have thought the last part of *X*₁ obscure and unsatisfactory: if he were the author of it, it is difficult to see why he should not have altered it where it stands, for this is not a case where the nature of the subject necessitates that a formula should first be put in more general terms, and not till later made determinate: besides the statement is silently corrected without any consciousness of its having preceded in the same treatise; e. g. there is nothing like *δ δ' ἐλέχθη μὲν πάσαι, οὐ σαφῶς δὲ ἐλέχθη* (*Post. An.* 100 a 14: comp. *Nic. Eth.* VII. 1138 b 26, *Eud. Eth.* 1220 a 16–20, 1249 b 3–6).

These two passages from the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics* are related like those referred to in the note on page 38.

SECTION III.

NIC. ETH. VII. iii. §§ 13, 14.

66. 'Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ τελευταία πρότασις, κ.τ.λ. . . . αἰσθητικῆς (comma after *δρον*). The object of the last part of this passage is to point out that the Socratic opinion about *ἀκρασία* agrees with the theory just given, inasmuch as knowledge proper has not been allowed to the *ἀκρατής* (*οὐ γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης παρούσης, κ.τ.λ.*). The latter statement would be consistent with what has been said, if by 'knowledge proper' was meant the presence of both major and minor premisses; for the *ἀκρατής* has only the major. But the context does not allow this interpretation. The reason it assigns for the absence of knowledge proper is 'that the minor premiss is not so much of the nature of true knowledge as the major' (*διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου μὴδ' ἐπιστημονικὸν ὁμοίως εἶναι δοκεῖν τῷ καθόλου τὸν ἔσχατον δρον*). This must mean that the *ἀκρατής* has not true *ἐπιστήμη*, because he has only the minor and not the major: which of course is in direct contradiction to the beginning of § 13 and to the rest of the chapter.

It might perhaps be objected that this difficulty is overcome if *οὐ παρούσης* be taken to mean that the universal is only present implicitly or potentially. But (1) it seems scarcely possible that

of ἐναντιώσεως
~ 1235 13-15
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οὐ παρούσης, without further addition, could be so understood, and (2) according to § 9 (D₂, 1147 a 32) the right universal (major) is actually present in ἀκρασία, the word ἐνεῖναι being used both of it and of the misleading universal (major). In the other version also (§ 6, D₁) is read χρώμενος τῇ καθόλου ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος, so that the ἀκρατής may have the universal in actuality.

67. The above seems to prove that this passage cannot as it stands be reconciled with the rest of the chapter. In the last part of it, οὐδ' αὕτη περιέλεται διὰ τὸ πάθος ἀλλὰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς, there is a similar confusion. It has been shewn from the context that τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης means the major premiss, therefore τῆς αἰσθητικῆς (ἐπιστήμης) must be the minor premiss given by perception; compare also § 13, ἡ τελευταία πρότασις ὁῶσα αἰσθητοῦ, 1147 b 9. With τῆς αἰσθητικῆς would naturally be understood παρούσης; but it is just perceptual knowledge (of the minor premiss) which is wanting in the ἀκρατής. To avoid this περιελκομένης and not παρούσης might be understood with τῆς αἰσθητικῆς, as the preceding clause is only a variation of οὐδὲ ταύτης περιελκομένης. Then, however, αἰσθητικῆς ἐπιστήμης cannot be a minor premiss of perception actually present, but the faculty of such a minor: this involves the harshness of making περιέλκεσθαι, in the clause οὐδ' αὕτη περιέλεται διὰ τὸ πάθος, refer to the distracting effect of πάθος upon knowledge when actually present, and in the clause ἀλλὰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς to its effect upon a faculty of knowledge: and the objection (paragraph 66) to what precedes both remains unaltered. Nothing is gained by supposing τῆς αἰσθητικῆς to mean that knowledge in accordance with which the ἀκρατής acts (ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης), described in §§ 9, 10 (D₂, 1147 a 24-b 3), for τῆς αἰσθητικῆς must be a minor premiss, as just shown; and therefore the sense of the passage would be, that this knowledge contained no universal, but only a particular; which is contrary to §§ 9, 10, where both a universal (major—παντὸς γλυκεὸς γεύεσθαι δεῖ) and a particular (minor—τουτὶ γλυκὺ) condition the wrong action of the ἀκρατής.

68. It seems as though the intention had been to express two things:—

(1) To true or complete knowledge is necessary the actual presence both of the major and of the minor (ἡ τελευταία πρότασις κυρία τῶν πράξεων); the ἀκρατής has not the minor; therefore he has not true knowledge, and Socrates is in this sense right—οὐ γὰρ τῆς κυρίως εἶναι δοκούσης ἐπιστήμης παρούσης γίνεται τὸ πάθος.

(2) 'True knowledge' (κυρία ἐπιστήμη) may have another (re-

lative) meaning, the universal as opposed to the particular. The perception of the former is not perverted (*περιέλκεται*) in the *ἀκρατής*, but the perception of the latter, for he has the right major and not the right minor. The knowledge therefore which is perverted in the *ἀκρατής*, in the sense that the *faculty* of it is obscured and prevented from actualisation, is not the true kind. In this way also Socrates would be right: compare ii. 1, 1145 b 23-24.

But it seems impossible to get this out of the present text, because, as has been shown, the position of the sentence *καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου ὅρον* prevents *κυρίως εἶναι δοκούσης ἐπιστήμης* from having the right meaning. If this sentence be written after *τῆς κυρίως γίνεται τὸ πάθος*, instead of before it, and *ἀλλ' ἡ αἰσθητική* read, the meaning wanted could be got, if *αὐτή* could possibly stand for *κυρία ἐπιστήμη* in the new sense determined by the clause *καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου κ.τ.λ.*, which would be now interposed; but if this seems too harsh to stand, something has probably been lost.

69. The words *ὥσπερ ὁ οἰνωμένος τὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέους*, 1147 b 12, compared with *ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἔπη λέγουσιν Ἐμπεδοκλέους* in *C₂* (1147 a 20), and the illustration of the drunken man (1147 a 14), incline to the conjecture that §§ 13, 14 may not belong to the same version as *C₂*, and should follow perhaps in the first column after *D₁*. If this be so, *ὥς οὐκ ἦν τὸ ἔχειν . . . Ἐμπεδοκλέους* in *D₁* has been expanded into the passage which forms the last part of *C₂*: *ἡ τελευταία πρότασις δόξα τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ κυρία τῶν πράξεων* in *D₁* (1147 b 9) would correspond to *ἡ δ' ἑτέρα (δόξα) περὶ τῶν καθ' ἑκαστὰ ἐστίν, ὧν αἰσθησις ἤδη κυρία* in *D₂* (1147 a 25); *ὁ ἐν πάθει ὧν τοὶ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν*, which is found twice in *C₂*, 1147 a 15 and 19. See also paragraph 28 mid.

The compiler may have removed §§ 13, 14 from the end of the first version to the end of the second, as forming the best conclusion to the compiled chapter: the apparent intermixture of the other members makes this possible.

It is not necessary, in order to support this conjecture, to suppose the compiler altered the tense in *ὥς οὐκ ἦν τὸ ἔχειν, κ.τ.λ.*, as it need only express reference to a current distinction.

There should be a full stop after *Ἐμπεδοκλέους*: and either *ἐπεὶ* has the meaning noted in paragr. 37, or (more probably) there is an ellipse,—‘since the right major would be acted on if the right minor were present, (and the *ἀκρατής* having the right major does not act on it,) the *ἀκρατής* cannot have the right minor.’ Compare 31 fin.

SECTION IV.

NIC. ETH. VII. vi. §§ 1-4.

70. There is some indication that the account of *ἀκρασία θυμοῦ* may be by the same author as the second version of ch. iii.

(a) It is argued that *θυμός* is less disgraceful than *ἐπιθυμία* ('appetite'), because the former is determined in a way by reason (*λόγος*) and the latter is not. Yet the explanation of action from these different impulses (§ 1, 1149 a 32 seqq.) makes *λόγος* enter into both: of anger it is said, *ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἡ ἡ φαντασία ὅτι ὕβρις ἢ ὀλιγωρία ἐδήλωσεν, κ.τ.λ.*: of appetite, *ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἐὰν μόνον εἴπῃ ὅτι ἡδὺ ὁ λόγος ἡ ἡ αἴσθησις ὀρμῇ, κ.τ.λ.*

Since listening to *λόγος* (*ἀκούειν τι τοῦ λόγου*) is what differences *θυμός* from *ἐπιθυμία*, the connection of *λόγος* with both sides is confusing; especially as no explanation is given, as for instance that different manifestations of reason are meant, and the very next sentence is *ὥσθ' ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ πως, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ*.

This may be accounted for perhaps by a comparison of ch. iii, §§ 10-11. The special characteristic of the version to which the passage belongs is that the action of the *ἀκρατής* from *ἐπιθυμία* is said to be in a sense *ὑπὸ λόγου* (see above paragraph 28 fin.), and the author is so interested in his own addition that he partly neglects and partly confuses the true problem. The doctrine here (ch. vi, § 1) seems to be the same, and its introduction causes a similar confusion; so that both may possibly be by the same hand. The association of *φαντασία* with *λόγος* is not irreconcilable with iii, 11, for the author is perhaps thinking that a sensuous presentation may be necessary to the consciousness of an injury.

The passage in the Problems, 949 b 13 seqq., on the connection of *λόγος* and *θυμός*, which may have suggested the present account, is free from these difficulties.

A further obvious confusedness of expression is the use of *ὀργῇ ποιῶν* and *ὀργίζεσθαι* in such different references within the same context, § 4 of the chapter. In the second version of ch. iii. there seems to be another, more serious, inaccuracy: see paragraph 28 mid.

(β) The style of the chapter differs very much from most of the book, as having less scientific form, and more vivacity of expression.

There are two graphic illustrations, οἱ ταχεῖς τῶν διακόνων, κ.τ.λ., οἱ κύνες πρὶν σκέψασθαι, κ.τ.λ.: two amusing stories, ὁ ἀπολογούμενος ὅτι τὸν πατέρα τύπτοι, κ.τ.λ., ὁ ἐλκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ, κ.τ.λ.: two poetical quotations, 1149 b 15-17: and a Platonic personification of θυμός and ἐπιθυμία.

To this also there are some resemblances in ch. iii., second version: compare the illustrations added in C₂ (Table I), which shew some fondness for description. In D₂ of the same version there is a tendency to personify faculties of the soul not found in the parallel passage, e.g. ἡ μὲν λέγει φεύγειν ταῦτο ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἄγει. Compare also ἀναγκὴ τὸ συμπερασθὲν ἔνθα μὲν φάναι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς πράττειν εὐθύς, ch. iii. D₂, with ὁ (θυμός) ὥσπερ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ πολεμεῖν, χαλεπαίνει δὲ εὐθύς, ch. vi. § 1.

(γ) There is some difficulty in the way in which the subject is introduced, ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἡττον αἰσχροῦ ἀκρασία ἢ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἢ ἡ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν θεωρήσωμεν. For it has already been said (ch. iv), if not in the same words, that the ἀκρασίαι κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, including among others ἀκρασία θυμοῦ, are less disgraceful than ἀκρασία proper, called here ἡ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἀκρασία or ἡ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν: but (1) this is not recognised, nor (2) is any reason given why a special proof should be undertaken in the case of ἀκρασία θυμοῦ and not for the other ἀκρασίαι κατὰ πρόσθεσιν.

The want of organic connection with the context is even greater in the case of ch. iii: see paragraph 60, γ.

The position of ἀκρασία θυμοῦ in ch. iv. is not without obscurity, for θυμός cannot be called φύσει αἰρετόν, φύσει τῶν καλῶν καὶ αγαθῶν, αἰρετόν καθ' αὐτό, in the same sense as the examples κέρδος, τιμὴ, νίκη; it is not classed with these higher ἡδέα, and ἀκρασία in respect of it is associated with ἀκρασία in respect of them without explanation. Perhaps the oversight occasioned later the introduction of a separate proof, in ch. vi, that ἀκρασία θυμοῦ is not so blameworthy as ἀκρασία of bodily pleasures: and it is worth notice that § 3 (1149 b 19), adds as corollary the assertion that it is not properly (ἀπλῶς) ἀκρασία, without reference to the result of ch. iv, which may well have been thought insufficient. On the other hand, it is not so likely that ch. iv is the later, for an author with ch. vi before him would perhaps hardly have left the part on ἀκρασία θυμοῦ so ambiguous; nor does that part look like a later insertion into both the versions of ch. iv. Compare paragraph 94.

71. If the first part of the chapter is really contemporaneous with the second version of ch. iii, it would probably not belong to the same version as the remaining part, §§ 5-7, as this seems to be the

earlier of the three parallel versions in chs. v and vi. This does not invalidate the argument in paragraph 17 (δ), for *καὶ ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ ἐγκράτεια* in § 5 may have been changed, to fit the place, from *ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ἡ ἐγκράτεια*, which last would connect the second discussion of unnatural pleasures with the end of ch. iv, supposing ch. v omitted.

SECTION V.

NIC. ETH VII. viii. § 1 and § 3.

72. It has been shown (paragraph 34) that § 2 of ch. viii. 1151 a 1-5, in all probability does not belong to its present context, and that § 3 seems to be continuous in subject with § 1: but the removal of § 2 does not clear away all difficulties. The words *ἀλλὰ πῃ ἴσως*, which mean that *ἀκρασία* and *κακία* (= *ἀκολασία*) are somehow alike, are followed by a sentence which, from its form, (*τὸ μὲν γὰρ . . . τὸ δὲ . . .*), should explain the likeness, but gives, on the contrary, the essential point of difference.

If *ἀλλὰ πῃ ἴσως* is put in a parenthesis, so that *τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ προαίρεσιν, κ.τ.λ.* explains *ὅτι μὲν οὖν κακία*, this 'non sequitur' is avoided: then the parenthetical clause affirming some likeness would be inserted as a qualification into the statement of difference. But the next sentence affirms the fact of likeness, and puts it also in the form of a qualification of the previous statement,—*οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὁμοίων γε*: so that *ἀλλὰ πῃ ἴσως* is not only most awkwardly placed, but quite redundant. No improvement is made by a transposition, and the clause can scarcely be a gloss, for the words *οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὁμοίων γε* make a gloss too obviously unnecessary.

73. Is it possible that there is here also a combination of duplicates? The following alternatives are offered:—

(1) Perhaps the words *τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ προαίρεσιν, κ.τ.λ.*, 1151 a 7, should follow after the last words of § 1, *ἡ δ' ἀκρασία οὐ λανθάνει*: of the sentence removed the part *ὅτι μὲν οὖν κακία . . . φανερόν* may be a shorter duplicate of *καὶ ὅλως δ' ἕτερον . . . λανθάνει τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ προαίρεσιν τὸ δὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἔστιν*, and *ἀλλὰ πῃ ἴσως* may be the beginning of a duplicate of *οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὁμοίων γε κατὰ τὰς πράξεις*, thus:—

Καὶ ὅλως δ' ἕτερον τὸ γένος ἀκρασίας καὶ κακίας, ἢ μὲν ὅτι μὲν οὖν κακία γὰρ κακία λανθάνει ἢ δ' ἀκρασία οὐ λανθάνει· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἢ ἀκρασία οὐκ παρὰ προαίρεσιν τὸ δὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἔστιν· ἔστι, φανερόν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὁμοίον γε κατὰ τὰς πράξεις, κ.τ.λ. ἄλλὰ πῃ ἴσως.

(2) The neuter genders, however, which precede and follow the feminines in the present text, as well as the correspondence (in effect) of the words marked ^b.....^b, suggest a different resolution, thus:—

<p>^a Καὶ ὅλως δ' ἕτερον τὸ γένος ἀκρασίας καὶ κακίας^a, ^b τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ προαίρεσιν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἔστιν· ^b ^c οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὁμοίον γε κατὰ τὰς πράξεις^c</p>	<p>^a ὅτι μὲν οὖν κακία ἢ ἀκρασία οὐκ ἔστι, φανερόν· ^a ^b ἢ μὲν γὰρ κακία λανθάνει ἢ δ' ἀκρασία οὐ λανθάνει· ^b ^c ἀλλὰ πῃ ἴσως....^c</p>
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The position of ἀλλὰ πῃ ἴσως is, however, awkward, yet perhaps not more so than that of ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ γε, in VII. ii. 6, 1146 a 12. For such short duplicates see paragraph 89.

74. If §§ 1 and 3 formed a continuous whole originally in some way, and the compiler inserted § 2 into it (see paragr. 34), he might have written ὅτι μὲν οὖν κακία, κ.τ.λ., § 3, to connect again the last half with the part to which it was originally contiguous; but then he would have no conceivable reason to add the words ἀλλὰ πῃ ἴσως, so that this explanation seems unlikely.

SECTION VI.

NIC. ETH. VII. viii. §§ 1, 3, 4, 5.

75. Ch. viii. § 4-5, has already been resolved into two duplicates, A₂ and A₁: see Part II., Section II.

To these versions the contents of the passage formed by uniting § 1 and § 3 of the same chapter, § 2 being omitted (paragr. 34), shew a general parallelism.

The subject of the three, A', A₂, A₁, may be divided as follows:—

(a) Difference of the ἀκρατής and ἀκόλαστος.

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A', ὁ μὲν ἀνίκατος, ὁ δ' ἱκατός.

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A₁, ὁ ἀκρατής βελτίων τοῦ ἀκόλαστου οὐδὲ φαῖλος ἀπλῶς, κ.τ.λ.

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(2) The reason of this is that the ἀκόλαστος believes he is right, the ἀκρατής knows he is wrong.—

A', ὁ ἀκόλαστος οὐ μεταμελητικός· ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαίρεσει (i.e. he acts with the conviction that he is right), ὁ δ' ἀκρατής μεταμελητικός. παρὰ προαίρεσιν, 1151 a 7.

A₂, ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ διὰ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν ὁ δὲ πέπεισται.

A₁, ὥστε δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν . . . δεῖν . . . οὐ κρατεῖ.

Το ἡ μὲν κακία λανθάνει ἡ δ' ἀκρασία οὐ λανθάνει in A' correspond the more precise accounts in A₁ and A₂ :—

A₂, ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ μοχθηρία τὴν ἀρχὴν ἡ μὲν φθείρει ἡ δὲ σώζει.

A₁, σώζεται γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον ἡ ἀρχή.

(β) The resemblance of the ἀκρατής and ἀκόλαστος.—

A', οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὅμοιον γε κατὰ τὰς πράξεις οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἄδικοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶν, ἀδικοῦσι δέ.

In A₂ and A₁ the likeness is not dwelt on so expressly, but yet they supply a more precise formula for it. In A₂ the common point is διώκειν τὰς καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον σωματικὰς ἡδονάς, so also in A₁, ὅν ὥστε μὲν μὴ πράττειν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, κ.τ.λ., 1151 a 21–24.

Is it possible then that A' is a third parallel version? For this conjecture there is some support beside the correspondence of the subject matter; for it has been already shewn that A₁ can scarcely follow after A' (see paragraph 11), and A₂ begins as though it were introducing a new subject, with no indication whatever that a discussion so parallel to it has preceded. If A', A₁, A₂, are three parallel versions, then A' is probably the earliest, because, as the above analysis shows, A₁ and A₂ treat the subject common to the three in a more technical and formal manner, and carry the investigation a little deeper.

If § 3 be not joined to § 1, the parallelism will only be altered by the omission of (β).

76. The passage in § 7 of ch. x., ὅμοιοι δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκρατής καὶ ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἕτεροι μὲν ὄντες, ἀμφοτέρω δὲ τὰ σωματικὰ ἡδέα διώκουσιν, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν καὶ οἰόμενος δεῖν ὁ δ' οὐκ οἰόμενος, might belong to a different part of the same version of the treatise as either A₁ or A₂, because, as before said, they do not draw special attention to the likeness between the ἀκρατής and ἀκόλαστος, though they give material for determining it: οἰόμενος δεῖν compared with A₁ (1151 a 23), suggests connection with A₁ rather than A₂.

SECTION VII.

ETH. NIC. VII. vii. § 3. (TABLE IV.)

77. In the words τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων τὸ μὲν μαλακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον ὃ δ' ἀκόλαστος, 1150 a 31-2, there is great difficulty, for they do not in the least accord with what has gone before. The only character in the preceding section (§ 3, 1150 a 25-31) which could be taken for μαλακίας εἶδος is that of the μὴ προαιρούμενος whose motive is to avoid the pain of ἐπιθυμία, and this has been spoken of in connection with ἀκρασία and not ἀκολασία (τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων ὃ μὲν ἄγεται διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, ὃ δὲ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας): nor has anything been said of it which could occasion the remark that it is not to be confused with ἀκολασία ('rather a sort of μαλακία than ἀκολασία'), but on the contrary it has been assigned to a class of the μὴ προαιρούμενοι, and so is definitely opposed to ἀκολασία which is διὰ προαίρεσιν. Again, why μαλακίας εἶδος and not μαλακία? the division of the μὴ προαιρούμενοι is exhaustive as its form shows, and should include all ἀκρασία and all μαλακία.

The incoherence disappears if the whole passage τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων . . . χείρων τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς be removed, so that the sentence τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων, κ.τ.λ. comes after § 2 (at 1150 a 25), and refers to it. For the main interest of § 2 is in two characters, the ἀκόλαστος and ὃ φεύγων τὰς σωματικὰς λύπας μὴ δι' ἥτταν ἀλλὰ διὰ προαίρεσιν: the latter has been associated with the ἀκόλαστος because he acts διὰ προαίρεσιν and on a bodily impulse; hence it is relevant to call attention to the distinction between them and say that the one (ὃ φεύγων τὰς σωματικὰς λύπας, κ.τ.λ.) is not the true ἀκόλαστος (whose motive is pleasure), but rather (μᾶλλον) allied to the μαλακός (because the motive is pain): and the author uses the words μαλακίας εἶδος of the character, and not μαλακία, intentionally, because μαλακία proper differs from it in not being διὰ προαίρεσιν. Comp. paragr. 55 β.

78. This result cannot be secured by merely putting the removed passage into a parenthesis. The matter in it cannot be treated as parenthetical: for, if it remains where it is, a definite transition is made from the characters whose wrong action is διὰ προαίρεσιν, the ἀκόλαστος on the side of pleasure and his counterpart of the side of pain, to the μὴ προαιρούμενοι who are the ἀκρατής and the φεύγων τὴν λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας; after this it would be impossible to

return to the first set of characters by the mere words τῶν λεχθέντων . . . ὁ μὲν . . . ὁ δέ, κ.τ.λ., and it is clear that the case is not altered by the interposition of the clause παντὶ δ' ἂν δόξειε . . . ἀκόλαστος χείρων τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς, which has only to do with the ἀκόλαστος and the ἀκρατής.

Nor is it enough to write τῶν δὴ λεχθέντων, κ.τ.λ. before § 3 (i.e. before τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων) instead of after it, for there are other difficulties. In the first place the sentence παντὶ δ' ἂν δόξειε, κ.τ.λ. interrupts in the most irrelevant manner a context which has for its object to explain the characters of καρτερία and μαλακία; and in the second place it is equally difficult to keep the first part of § 3 in the text, because it makes the pain to which the μαλακός yields that of unsatisfied desire, which by no means suits the description of the μαλακός in §§ 5, 6, where the examples are certainly not of such pains.

An obvious suggestion is the alteration of ἀκόλαστος into ἀκρατής in § 3, fin., 1150 a 32: but (1) that does not overcome the last-mentioned difficulty, for, as already said, τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων ὁ μὲν . . . ὁ δέ is an exhaustive division, and therefore the only kind of pain in μαλακία would be λύπη ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας; and (2) it does not overcome the difficulty of the words παντὶ δέ, κ.τ.λ.

79. If the whole passage then (1150 a 25-31) is taken away, the words τῶν δὴ λεχθέντων form the transition from § 2 (1150 a 16-25), to the subject of § 4 (1150 a 32 seqq.), and therefore δὴ, the MS. reading, would be right and not δέ (which has been proposed), even though something may have fallen out.

80. But in the following sentence the reading is probably not right, and there has been a transposition of the words ἐγκρατής and μαλακός. Instead of ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀκρατεῖ ὁ ἐγκρατής, τῷ δὲ μαλακῷ ὁ καρτερικός, should be read ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀκρατεῖ ὁ μαλακός, τῷ δὲ ἐγκρατεῖ ὁ καρτερικός: because (1) the next clause, coupled by γάρ, explains the difference between the καρτερικός and the ἐγκρατής, not the καρτερικός and the μαλακός; and (2) the object of the chapter (see paragr. 55) is to find the characters on the side of pain which are correlative of, and opposed to, the characters concerned with pleasure: namely, the φεύγων τὰς σωματικὰς λύπας (=μαλακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον) to the ἀκόλαστος, the μαλακός to the ἀκρατής and the καρτερικός to the ἐγκρατής; and such an opposition has immediately preceded the words under consideration, the first one between the ἀκόλαστος and his counterpart. The proposed reading therefore agrees much better both with what precedes and with what follows. Compare the grouping in the parallel version, A₁, 1150 a 14-15.

SECTION VIII.

NIC. ETH. VII. iv. §§ 3-4 (D_1), § 6 (D_2), and vii. § 3.

(TABLE IX.)

CONJECTURED COMPLETION OF THE DUPLICATE D_2 .

81. The second part, E_2 , of ch. vii, § 3, which, as shown in the foregoing section, seems not to belong to ch. vii, has a closely corresponding duplicate, E_1 , in ch. iv. § 4, 1148 a 17-22, so that it may really belong to one of the versions of ch. iv.

If it be put in the place which E_1 at present occupies, the new context joins perfectly (1148 a 17), ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν προαιροῦνται, οἱ δ' (i.e. οἱ ἀκρατεῖς) οὐ προαιροῦνται. *τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων (i.e. τῶν ἀκρατῶν) ὁ μὲν, κ.τ.λ. The cause, however, of this may be, not that the added passage originally followed in this version after the sentence which it fits, but that the sentence had a duplicate in the other version which, though probably different otherwise in form, led up similarly to τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων: the existence of such a duplicate is the more probable because of the close correspondence of the versions in other respects.

82. That this may be the true state of the case is not unlikely, for the following reasons:—

The passage containing E_2 (τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων . . . ἀλλήλων. παντὶ . . . ἀκρατοῦς (1150 a 25-31), would not follow well after D_1 : for (1) it repeats what has already been said in D_1 , that pain may be the motive in ἀκρασία as well as pleasure, 1148 a 6-10; (2) it determines the painful motive to be the pain of unsatisfied desire for pleasure (ἐπιθυμία), and so contradicts D_1 , where the examples ἀλέα and ψύχος are not λυπαὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, nor are δίψα and πείνα¹.

But these two grounds for disconnecting the passage from D_1 are grounds for connecting it with D_2 .

It has been seen (paragraphs 7, 8) that the other members, B_2 , C_2 , of the version to which D_2 belongs (compare Table II) reproduce every feature of the first version, and even add to them. It is not therefore unlikely that D_2 may have had the same relation to D_1 originally: if

¹ See, on the subject in general, paragraph 39 β.

so, it wants something to correspond to $\delta \mu\eta \tau\hat{\omega} \pi\rho\alpha\iota\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\theta\alpha\iota \tau\hat{\omega}\nu \tau\epsilon \eta\delta\acute{\epsilon}\omega\nu$, κ.τ.λ. D_2 1148 a 6-9, for it neither mentions that the $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\eta\varsigma$ acts $\pi\alpha\rho\alpha \pi\rho\alpha\lambda\rho\epsilon\sigma\iota\nu$, nor that his motive may be pain.

If now the passage $\tau\hat{\omega}\nu \delta\grave{\epsilon} \mu\eta \pi\rho\alpha\iota\rho\alpha\rho\alpha\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega\nu$, κ.τ.λ. is added to D_2 , (1) an almost complete duplicate of D_1 results; compare the clauses in each column of Table IX marked $x\dots x$, $h\dots h$, $m\dots m$; and (2) there is no contradiction in D_2 as to $\eta \lambda\acute{\upsilon}\pi\eta \eta \acute{\alpha}\pi\delta \tau\eta\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$.

A sentence $\gamma\dots\gamma$, somewhat resembling $\gamma\dots\gamma$ in the opposite version, as above suggested, may have fallen out, in which it was said that whereas the $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\lambda\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\varsigma$, &c., acted with $\pi\rho\alpha\lambda\rho\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$, the $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ were $\mu\eta \pi\rho\alpha\iota\rho\alpha\rho\acute{\upsilon}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\iota$, so that $\omicron\iota \mu\eta \pi\rho\alpha\iota\rho\alpha\rho\acute{\upsilon}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\iota$ could have the same meaning in the version (D_2), as in the other (D_1), i.e. the $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ alone.

The difference in relative position of the sentences x and y in the 2nd version is what might be expected: for the order in D_1 being $x \text{ } h \text{ } m \text{ } y$, the writer of D_2 has begun with $m \text{ } h$ (reversing their order), so that, if he intended to complete the parallelism, x and y would remain over, and in the nature of the case a sentence of the form y would be a fitting introduction to the x of D_2 : see paragraph 81.

83. The reason of the change of view in the supposed completion of D_2 as to the painful motive may be this.

The characters mentioned in D_1 as concerned with bodily pains (which are not mere pains of $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha$) are expressly included in the class of $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ proper; according to ch. vii. these would be $\mu\alpha\lambda\alpha\kappa\omicron\iota$ and not $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ proper. The author of D_2 may have held the latter opinion; and therefore have intentionally avoided connecting such pains as $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\alpha$, $\psi\hat{\upsilon}\chi\omicron\varsigma$, &c. with $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\rho\alpha\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$. On the other hand, the mention by D_1 of pain in $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\rho\alpha\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$, taken together with the doctrine of Nic. Eth. III. x. xi. (already detailed in paragraph 39) may have suggested to the author of D_2 that there was a pain in $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\rho\alpha\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ proper, the $\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\pi\eta \acute{\alpha}\pi\delta \tau\eta\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$, and on this he may have grounded the subdivision of $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\rho\alpha\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ proper ($\delta \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu \dots \delta \delta\grave{\epsilon} \dots \omega\sigma\tau\epsilon \delta\iota\alpha\phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\nu \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\eta\lambda\omega\nu$).

Such a distinction, as has been shown, is not consistent with the Aristotelian doctrine to which it is related: see paragraph 57 γ .

84. With this feature of the supposed completion of D_2 agrees E_2 (which follows it in its old position, and has also been removed), for it does not connect the $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\lambda\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\varsigma$ with those bodily pains ($\tau\hat{\alpha}\varsigma \tau\hat{\omega}\nu \acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\gamma\kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{\omega}\nu \acute{\epsilon}\nu\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$ = e.g. $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\iota\nu\alpha\nu$, $\delta\acute{\iota}\psi\alpha\nu$), which according to E_1 may be his motives; compare the doctrine of ch. vii. according to which the character called in E_1 $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\lambda\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\varsigma$, with respect to pain, is not $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\lambda\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\varsigma$ proper. See paragraphs 53 (β) and 77.

The formula of E_1 , on the other hand, is in agreement with D_1 : compare 1147 a 7-8, D_1 , with 1148 a 19, 21-22, E_1 .

This gives some reason for thinking that E_1 actually belongs to the version with which it is already associated in the present text, and that E_2 belongs to the other version. But something must have fallen out before E_2 . The author passed in the preceding from the distinction of ἀκρατής κατὰ πρόσθεσιν and ἀκρατής ἀπλῶς, to differences in the class of characters to which the latter belongs in respect of the presence or absence of προαίρεσις, and to differences where προαίρεσις is not present, according as ἐπιθυμία is the motive or λύπη ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας. On these differences he may have grounded some remark about the comparative viciousness of the characters which they concern, and ended by saying that the worst was that ἀκόλαστος who had little or no ἐπιθυμία,—παντὶ δ' ἂν δόξειε, κ.τ.λ.

This agrees with the apparent gap before E_1 also.

The conjunction διό may of course be taken in its non-illative use, but even thus it must at least be equivalent to 'and so,' and implies that the subject which it introduces has been in some way prepared for: but it is by no means prepared for, and succeeds most abruptly. The subject of the whole chapter is the distinction of the ἀκρατής ἀπλῶς from the ἀκρατής κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, which is wound up in § 4 by the statement that the ἀκρατής ἀπλῶς has to do with the same pleasures and pains as the ἀκόλαστος, ἐγκρατής, and σώφρων, and that the characters so associated differ as regards προαίρεσις: it is clear that the special depravity of that ἀκόλαστος who has little or no ἐπιθυμία is put in no sort of connection with this.

85. The way in which μαλακοί occurs in D_1 , 1148 a 12, is remarkable: it is said that the pains with which the ἀκρατής ἀπλῶς has to do are bodily, and a sign of this is that people are called μαλακοί for yielding to them; whereas according to ch. vii, as before said, μαλακοί is the proper name for such characters.

This difficulty admits of explanation, and accords with the view taken of the relation of D_1 "....." to D_2 ".....". It has been pointed out (paragraph 39 β) that the third book of the Nicomachean Ethics, and the Eudemian book corresponding, associate μαλακία with cowardice, and not with ἀκολασία, and that there is no trace of the definite coordination (see ch. vii.) of καρτερία and μαλακία with σωφροσύνη, ἀκρασία, &c. The author of D_1 , though deviating in one respect from Eud. Eth. II, and Nic. Eth. III, (i.e. as to the painful motives which concern σωφροσύνη and ἀκολασία) has not advanced to the development of the theory of μαλακία found in ch. vii: he merely calls

attention to the fact that the ignominious term *μαλακός* is applied where men yield to 'bodily' pains, to show that such conduct is held specially bad and belongs therefore to *ἀκρασία* proper, and not *ἀκρασία κατὰ πρόσθεσιν*. Just as he has said before (*C*₁) that the disgrace attaching to *ἀκρασία* of 'bodily' pleasure is proof of its being *ἀκρασία* proper. Compare the two sentences 1148 a 2, 3, *σημείον δέ, κ.τ.λ.* and 1148 a 11, 12, *σημείον δέ, κ.τ.λ.*

The remark, however, in *D*₁ is a sort of transition to the theory of ch. vii. and may have suggested it. See also paragraph 57.

The separate mention in A of *καρτερία* and *μαλακία* and the association of them with *ἐγκράτεια* and *ἀκρασία*, in the manner of ch. vii, shew perhaps that A does not really belong to the first version but to the second: compare paragraph 90.

86. The differences in subject matter between the parts now added after *D*₁ and *D*₂, correspond, at least as above explained, to the general differences already pointed out between the versions to which the latter belong.

The supposed Eudemianism *λύπη ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας* falls on the same side as the others, i.e. in the second version: though this is of little importance, see paragraph 58.

87. If the right place has been found for ch. vii, § 3 (1150 a 25-31) it is possible to explain its removal from it by a compiler.

(1) From the loss of the sentence '.....', the passage, beginning as it does with *τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων*, would not cohere with what was left of *D*₂.

(2) The compiler might suppose that the character *ὁ ἀγόμενος διὰ τὴν λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας* was the *μαλακός*, and this might lead him to seek a place for what did not fit in here in the chapter on *μαλακία*, where he seems to have associated two versions of the subject besides (see Pt. I, Sec. V).

(3) The place for insertion in ch. vii would be indicated by the words *διὰ προαίρεσιν* at the end of § 2, 1150 a 25 (*.....μὴ δι' ἥτταν ἀλλὰ διὰ προαίρεσιν* **τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων, κ.τ.λ.*)

The motives for the change, and the unintelligent way in which a context was disturbed by the interposition of really discrepant matter are exactly paralleled in the position of ch. vii, § 2 (see paragraph 34), where there is also a similar removal of duplicates to different parts of the book.

PART VI.

CONCLUSION.

SECTION I.

ON THE EVIDENCE OF COMPILATION FROM PARALLEL VERSIONS.

88. There are some obvious objections to inferring compilation from repetitions. An author may in the same treatise be led by the nature of the subject to repeat a previous train of thought. This could be done with full consciousness; and even the same phraseology might recur, either because advisable as in a treatise of more precise scientific form (logic, grammar and the like), or merely from poverty of style or carelessness. It may be done sometimes unconsciously, and the same words and illustrations repeated; but for these anomalies some at least plausible account must be given, such as the length and intricacy of the discussion, desultory manner of composition, and absence of revision.

These explanations cannot apply to any of the more important repetitions which have been discussed in the foregoing, the more hazardous conjectures of Part V being excluded from consideration.

In chapters iii, iv, v, vii, and viii, the parallel passages are close to one another; the repetition of the subject of ch. v in ch. vi is distant only a chapter; so that in all the hypothesis of forgetfulness is inadmissible. Some of these are so long, or have such a marked character, that the same might be affirmed if they were at the farthest distance from one another, which the limits of the treatise (VII. i-x) would allow.

Nor of course can it be said where the passages are contiguous that the nature of the subject occasions a return—the same holds of the versions in chapters v and vi. Besides the other relations pointed out in all these parallelisms seem quite incompatible with conscious repetition intended for the same context.

There remain four pairs of parallel passages, which are not contiguous. As for iv, 4 and vii, 3 (Tables IV and IX), the latter is so far from being suggested by the subject that it is quite irrelevant to it.

The other three pairs—viii, 2 and x, 4 (Table V), vii, 1 and x, 4 (Table IV), ii, 5 and x, 1, 2 (Table VII)—might seem *prima facie* possibly due to forgetfulness, but considerations have been assigned in each case which make that improbable.

SECTION II.

ON THE FORM OF THE MATERIALS.

89. Whether the parallel versions extended originally right through the book or not, it seems clear that they extended farther than what remains now in the text.

For instance in ch. iii there is reason to think that A' is a part of a somewhat longer passage, the rest being lost (see paragraph 29); the same seems to be true of A₁ in ch. viii, and probably also of A₂ (see paragraph 12).

Something has been lost before ch. iv, § 4, E₁ (see paragraph 84), and probably also before its duplicate, ch. vii, § 3, E₂.

The first part of ch. x, § 4, which has two duplicates, may have lost some of its context (see paragraph 24).

It has been shewn also that the other parts of chs. viii. and x. are probably fragmentary (paragraphs 35, 36).

These appearances, together with the number of the parallelisms, suggest, though they by no means prove, that there may have been three versions of the whole subject.

Of course it is possible, though not confirmed by a comparison of the Nicomachean and Eudemean versions of the same subjects, that in some parts they may have been identical. In some copy of a given version short variants only may have been introduced, and this would account for the existence of certain short duplicates, both in this book and elsewhere, which seem isolated and not connected with any other alternative pieces: the (supposed) compiler would preserve these with the same religious care as the rest.

90. It has been noticed that sometimes a pair of parallel passages is preceded by one which can be read indifferently before either: for instance, A in ch. iii, Table I, forms a beginning to either of the two versions which follow, B₁ C₁ D₁, or B₂ C₂ D₂: in ch. iv, Table II,

A stands in the same relation to the versions $B_1 C_1 D_1$, and $B_2 C_2 D_2$: in ch. v, Table III, A_3 can be read before B_1 or B_2 , and C after either.

It does not follow that the versions originally coincided at all these points: for the passages apparently common may have had one or more duplicates which have been lost (comp. paragraph 85 fin.), while the fact that the versions had parallel members standing in similar relations to their context made it possible sometimes for one member to cohere indifferently with its own successor or the duplicate of it.

The possibility of this is proved by some other circumstances. In ch. iii, as already seen (paragraph 59), B_1 and B_2 are interchangeable, so that either may be read in either version; if then B_1 , e. g. had been lost, the remaining duplicate B_2 would have been related to C_1 and C_2 , just as A in this chapter is now related to B_1 and B_2 .

Again, in ch. v (Table III), before B_3 and B_2 may be read not only A_3 but also A_1 from the version of the same subject in the next chapter. Thus in Table III, A_1 (ch. v.) coheres either with B_1 or B_2 , or B_3 : A_3 with B_3 or B_2 : C may be read after B_1 , B_2 , or B_3 .

Such a state of things accords well with the hypothesis of compilation from fragments of parallel versions: it will be found on looking at a harmony of the gospels that the parallel passages are very often interchangeable in the same way. Compare many of the sets of parallelisms in Tischendorf's *Synopsis Evangelica*.

91. If the versions are fragmentary because the manuscripts were torn or illegible, it is not probable that the pieces preserved represent the exact materials of the compiler. They would generally be preceded and followed by sentences which he omitted; some because they were imperfect and he could not restore them, some because they were the endings or beginnings of other subjects and could not be fitted in so as to make any sense. Perhaps, however, at the beginning of the version A_1 in ch. viii (Table VI), such a sentence was retained, because, through a misconception (see paragraph 12), it seemed possible to connect two duplicates by means of it.

SECTION III.

ON THE AUTHORSHIP.

92. If it be true, as has been contended, that where the text can be resolved into parallel passages, only one version and not the other can be fairly charged with 'Eudemianisms,' the arguments which have

hitherto at least been used for ascribing the book to 'Eudemus' (i.e. the supposed author of the Eudemean Ethics) cannot stand. Indeed the supporters of that theory seem unaware of the important parallel structure of the disputed books, which alone justifies a reopening of the discussion.

The opposite opinions of critics can be understood, if, while some parts of these books have a real affinity to the Eudemean, and others to the Nicomachean version of the Ethics, a unity of composition has been presupposed which does not exist.

It is not necessary to conclude where characteristics of 'Eudemean' thought and style seem present—see e.g. on chs. iv, viii, and iii (59)—that the author is Eudemus: the supposed Eudemeanisms may be rather post-Aristotelianisms, or show the work of a writer influenced by the Eudemean Ethics, or of a disciple of Eudemus.

There is, however, reason for thinking that the author of the principal part of the Eudemean Ethics may have written some of the book, both on account of the prominence of ἀκρασία in other books of the Eudemean version which contrast in this respect with their Nicomachean equivalents, and from the promise in Eud. Eth. III, ii, at the end of the chapter on σωφροσύνη and ἀκολασία:—ἀκριβέστερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ γένους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἔσται διαιρετόν ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὕστερον περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας. On the other hand, it seems very probable that there are parts of the book which he did not write. Compare what has been said of ch. iii in paragraph 60 β; of ch. i, § 5 and ii, § 12 in paragraph 65; of ch. iv, first version, in paragraph 39 β, and of ch. vii, in paragraph 57. The last two cases are more doubtful, but the evidence is at least rather against than for Eudemean origin.

If the argument connecting ch. vi with the second version of ch. iii be valid (see paragraph 70), then probably this chapter also is not 'Eudemean.'

93. As to the possibility of an Aristotelian element:—If it be right to ascribe Eud. Eth. VII to Eudemus, the argument in paragraph 63 makes it probable that ch. i is pre-Eudemean, and therefore (perhaps) by Aristotle.

Some parts seem free from Eudemeanisms, but they are not on that account necessarily Aristotelian. Compare for instance what has been said of the first versions of chs. iv and vii, paragraphs 39 (β) and 57 (α).

It seems very improbable that ch. iii is by Aristotle, and therefore, as before, the same may be true of ch. vi, § 1-4.

The confusion too in the latter, noted above (70, a), seems unworthy of Aristotle: so also the weak formalism of ch. ix, § 5, 1151 b 23-32, which is of a piece with that of the second version in ch. vii.

The definite position given to *ἀναισθησία* in ch. ix, § 5, is hardly compatible with Nic. Eth. III, xi, 7, 1118 a 5, and II, vii, 3, 1107 b 6; though perhaps with Eud. Eth. III, ii, 1230 b 13-20, 1231 a 26 seqq. It may be questioned whether Aristotle would have represented the better motive which prevails at last in Neoptolemus (ch. ix, § 4, 1151 b 17) as a desire for pleasure.

There are some things in the book which seem in every way good enough for Aristotle, such is ch. ii, § 1-5 (see paragraph 60, γ, i): and there may be a considerable portion indirectly at least derived from him.

94. The difficulty of relating to the context—(1) ch. iii. on potential knowledge (paragraph 60, γ); (2) ch. vi, § 1-4, *ἀκρασία θυμοῦ* (paragraph 70, γ)—may perhaps be due to the fact that these are a later growth in a subsequent version after the main scheme of the subject had been fixed, and that the original was not recast: perhaps too the same account is to be given of ch. vii, on *καρτερία* and *μαλακία*, and ch. i, § 4 (see paragraph 57, β), and of the short passages in chs. x, and i, discussed in Pt. V, Sec. I. Such a circumstance is probably not isolated in the Ethics.

One part at least of the treatise, if not others, seems to be neither by Aristotle nor Eudemus, namely, ch. iii, and therefore perhaps ch. vi, §§ 1-4 also: nor is this without some corroboration elsewhere.

95. It is not in itself improbable that there were several versions of the subject by different authors. The testimony of the ancient commentators shews that Eudemus and Theophrastus wrote what may be called new versions of some of the Aristotelian writings: the relation of these to the original is sometimes indicated by the words *παραφράζων* and *παρακολουθῶν*; not unfrequently is it said that they departed from the views of Aristotle on particular subjects: compare the passages collected by Fritzsche in his edition of the Eudemian Ethics, and Spengel in the Eudemi Fragmenta. Phanias is spoken of as writing on the same subjects as Aristotle: some ascribed the first book of the Metaphysics to Pasicles.

The two following passages perhaps favour the conjecture that such rewriting was a general practice (of which the later Paraphrases may be a survival¹) with the earlier Peripatetics:—

¹ The word *κωνόν* in the preface to the paraphrase by Themistius of Post An. I. (Spengel's Edn. page 1, l. 11), is relative to the period of commentary which had pre-

Ammonius in Arist. Categ. fol. 13 a (Spengel, Eud. Frag. XCIX.)

Δευτέρα δὲ (ἀφορμὴ τοῦ νοθεύεσθαι τὰ συγγράμματα τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους) ἡ τῶν συγγραμμάτων ὁμωνυμία· οἱ γὰρ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ Εὐδήμος καὶ Φανίας καὶ Θεόφραστος κατὰ ζῆλον τοῦ διδασκάλου γεγραφήκασιν κατηγορίας καὶ περὶ ἐρμηνείας καὶ ἀναλυτικῆν.

Apuleius, Apolog. cap. 36 (Spengel, Eud. Frag. CIX.)

pro tuâ eruditione legisti profecto Aristotelis περὶ ζώων γενέσεως, περὶ ζώων ἀνατομῆς, περὶ ζώων ἱστορίας multijuga volumina, preterea problemata innumera ejusdem, tum ex eadem sectâ ceterorum, in quibus id genus varia tractantur.

Compare also the well-known story about the Metaphysics given by Asclepius (Bekker, 519 b, 33), quoted by Spengel (Eud. Frag. CXX.):—

ὁ δὲ τρόπος τῆς συντάξεως, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ παρούσα πραγματεία οὐχ ὁμοίως ταῖς ἄλλαις ταῖς τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους συγκεκροτημένη, οὐδὲ τὸ εὐτακτόν τε καὶ συνεχὲς ἔχειν δοκοῦσα, ἀλλὰ τινὰ μὲν λείπει ὥς πρὸς τὸ συνεχὲς τῆς λέξεως, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἄλλων πραγματειῶν ὁλόκληρα μετενήκεται καὶ πολλάκις τὰ αὐτὰ λέγει· ἀπολογοῦνται δὲ ὑπὲρ τούτου καὶ καλῶς ἀπολογοῦνται, ὅτι γράψας τὴν παρούσαν πραγματείαν ἐπεμψεν αὐτὴν Εὐδήμῳ τῷ ἐταίρῳ αὐτοῦ τῷ Ῥοδίῳ, εἴτα ἐκεῖνος ἐνόμισε μὴ εἶναι καλὸν ὥς ἔτυχεν ἐκδοθῆναι εἰς πολλοὺς τηλικαύτην πραγματείαν. ἐν τῷ οὖν μέσῳ χρόνῳ ἐτελεύτησε καὶ διεφθάρησάν τινα τοῦ βιβλίου. μὴ τολμῶντες δὲ προσθεῖναι οἷκοθεν οἱ μεταγενέστεροι διὰ τὸ πολὺ πάννυ λείπεσθαι τῆς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐννοίας μετήγαγον ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτοῦ πραγματειῶν τὰ λείποντα ἀρμόσαντες, ὥς ἦν δυνατόν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τούτοις σωζομένην εὖροι ἂν τις τὴν τῶν λεγομένων ἀκολουθίαν. * * *
τὸ γὰρ μείζον ἄλφα οὗ φασιν εἶναι αὐτοῦ.

This passage is valuable, though some details may be distrusted, for it preserves a tradition as to one Aristotelian book: (1) that an attempt had been made to repair it by compilation from the supposed works of Aristotle; (2) that there was some uncertainty whether the materials which had been used were Aristotelian; (3) that the compilers felt hesitation in adding anything of their own.

ceded: it suits also the difference between the work of Themistius and that of Eudemus and Theophrastus, for the object of his paraphrase (comp. the preface referred to) is exegesis and not reconstruction.


Alexander of Aphrodisias believed that the Aristotelian arrangement of the *Metaphysics* had been deliberately altered by Eudemus, as the following passage shews:—

. . . καὶ οἶμαι καὶ ταῦτα

ἐκείνοις ἔδει συντάττεσθαι καὶ ἴσως ὑπὸ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλους συν-
τάσσεται ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ Εὐδήμου κεχώρισται.

Alex. Aphr. ad Arist. Met. Z, 1036 b 32-5 (Spengel CXXI).


The differences between this conjectured resolution of the text and Torstrik's account of the *De Anima*, whence the leading idea was derived, are—(1) the number of the original versions; (2) their sources; (3) the manner and (4) the motive of the arrangement and compilation. See Torstrik, *De Anima*, Praefat. esp. pp. 21-23.



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